Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Advancement of Learning', 'Finkish dispositions' and 'Propositions'

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
12124 Metaphysics is the best knowledge, because it is the simplest [Bacon]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
12123 Natural history supports physical knowledge, which supports metaphysical knowledge [Bacon]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
12119 Physics studies transitory matter; metaphysics what is abstracted and necessary [Bacon]
12120 Physics is of material and efficient causes, metaphysics of formal and final causes [Bacon]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
13941 Are the truth-bearers sentences, utterances, ideas, beliefs, judgements, propositions or statements? [Cartwright,R]
13942 Logicians take sentences to be truth-bearers for rigour, rather than for philosophical reasons [Cartwright,R]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
15464 The distinction between dispositional and 'categorical' properties leads to confusion [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
15463 All dispositions must have causal bases [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
15461 A 'finkish' disposition is real, but disappears when the stimulus occurs [Lewis]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
13945 A token isn't a unique occurrence, as the case of a word or a number shows [Cartwright,R]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
15462 Backtracking counterfactuals go from supposed events to their required causal antecedents [Lewis]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
12121 We don't assume there is no land, because we can only see sea [Bacon]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
12117 Science moves up and down between inventions of causes, and experiments [Bacon]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
12127 Many different theories will fit the observed facts [Bacon]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
12126 People love (unfortunately) extreme generality, rather than particular knowledge [Bacon]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
13948 For any statement, there is no one meaning which any sentence asserting it must have [Cartwright,R]
13950 People don't assert the meaning of the words they utter [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
13944 We can pull apart assertion from utterance, and the action, the event and the subject-matter for each [Cartwright,R]
13947 'It's raining' makes a different assertion on different occasions, but its meaning remains the same [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
13943 We can attribute 'true' and 'false' to whatever it was that was said [Cartwright,R]
13946 To assert that p, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to utter some particular words [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / F. Communication / 2. Assertion
13951 Assertions, unlike sentence meanings, can be accurate, probable, exaggerated, false.... [Cartwright,R]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
12125 Teleological accounts are fine in metaphysics, but they stop us from searching for the causes [Bacon]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
12118 Essences are part of first philosophy, but as part of nature, not part of logic [Bacon]