24 ideas
| 12124 | Metaphysics is the best knowledge, because it is the simplest [Bacon] |
| 12123 | Natural history supports physical knowledge, which supports metaphysical knowledge [Bacon] |
| 12119 | Physics studies transitory matter; metaphysics what is abstracted and necessary [Bacon] |
| 12120 | Physics is of material and efficient causes, metaphysics of formal and final causes [Bacon] |
| 4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
| 19081 | Coherence with a set of propositions suggests we can know the proposition corresponds [Davidson, by Donnellan] |
| 9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
| 15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
| 8806 | The concepts of belief and truth are linked, since beliefs are meant to fit reality [Davidson] |
| 12121 | We don't assume there is no land, because we can only see sea [Bacon] |
| 8252 | Davidson believes experience is non-conceptual, and outside the space of reasons [Davidson, by McDowell] |
| 8255 | Davidson says the world influences us causally; I say it influences us rationally [McDowell on Davidson] |
| 8804 | Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence [Davidson] |
| 8802 | Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them [Davidson] |
| 8801 | Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs [Davidson] |
| 8805 | Skepticism is false because our utterances agree, because they are caused by the same objects [Davidson] |
| 12117 | Science moves up and down between inventions of causes, and experiments [Bacon] |
| 12127 | Many different theories will fit the observed facts [Bacon] |
| 12126 | People love (unfortunately) extreme generality, rather than particular knowledge [Bacon] |
| 18703 | Davidson's Cogito: 'I think, therefore I am generally right' [Davidson, by Button] |
| 12125 | Teleological accounts are fine in metaphysics, but they stop us from searching for the causes [Bacon] |
| 4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |
| 12118 | Essences are part of first philosophy, but as part of nature, not part of logic [Bacon] |