23 ideas
12124 | Metaphysics is the best knowledge, because it is the simplest [Bacon] |
12123 | Natural history supports physical knowledge, which supports metaphysical knowledge [Bacon] |
12119 | Physics studies transitory matter; metaphysics what is abstracted and necessary [Bacon] |
12120 | Physics is of material and efficient causes, metaphysics of formal and final causes [Bacon] |
17311 | Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki] |
4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
17312 | It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations [Koslicki] |
17314 | The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki] |
9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
17313 | Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki] |
17309 | For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki] |
17315 | We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki] |
4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
12121 | We don't assume there is no land, because we can only see sea [Bacon] |
12117 | Science moves up and down between inventions of causes, and experiments [Bacon] |
12127 | Many different theories will fit the observed facts [Bacon] |
17317 | A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena [Koslicki] |
12126 | People love (unfortunately) extreme generality, rather than particular knowledge [Bacon] |
17316 | We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer [Koslicki] |
12125 | Teleological accounts are fine in metaphysics, but they stop us from searching for the causes [Bacon] |
4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |
12118 | Essences are part of first philosophy, but as part of nature, not part of logic [Bacon] |