24 ideas
12124 | Metaphysics is the best knowledge, because it is the simplest [Bacon] |
12123 | Natural history supports physical knowledge, which supports metaphysical knowledge [Bacon] |
12119 | Physics studies transitory matter; metaphysics what is abstracted and necessary [Bacon] |
12120 | Physics is of material and efficient causes, metaphysics of formal and final causes [Bacon] |
8868 | Objective truth arises from interpersonal communication [Davidson] |
15565 | Events have inbuilt essences, as necessary conditions for their occurrence [Lewis] |
15566 | Events are classes, and so there is a mereology of their parts [Lewis] |
15567 | Some events involve no change; they must, because causal histories involve unchanges [Lewis] |
15561 | The events that suit semantics may not be the events that suit causation [Lewis] |
15564 | An event is a property of a unique space-time region [Lewis] |
15563 | Properties are very abundant (unlike universals), and are used for semantics and higher-order variables [Lewis] |
8867 | A belief requires understanding the distinctions of true-and-false, and appearance-and-reality [Davidson] |
12121 | We don't assume there is no land, because we can only see sea [Bacon] |
10347 | Objectivity is intersubjectivity [Davidson] |
12117 | Science moves up and down between inventions of causes, and experiments [Bacon] |
12127 | Many different theories will fit the observed facts [Bacon] |
8866 | If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me [Davidson] |
10346 | Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world [Davidson, by Dummett] |
12126 | People love (unfortunately) extreme generality, rather than particular knowledge [Bacon] |
8870 | Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds [Davidson] |
8869 | The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers [Davidson] |
12125 | Teleological accounts are fine in metaphysics, but they stop us from searching for the causes [Bacon] |
15562 | Causation is a general relation derived from instances of causal dependence [Lewis] |
12118 | Essences are part of first philosophy, but as part of nature, not part of logic [Bacon] |