Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Advancement of Learning', 'Letters to Fichte' and 'Essential Attribution'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

21 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
12124 Metaphysics is the best knowledge, because it is the simplest [Bacon]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
12123 Natural history supports physical knowledge, which supports metaphysical knowledge [Bacon]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
12119 Physics studies transitory matter; metaphysics what is abstracted and necessary [Bacon]
12120 Physics is of material and efficient causes, metaphysics of formal and final causes [Bacon]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
11184 Aristotelian essentialism is about shared properties, individuating essentialism about distinctive properties [Marcus (Barcan)]
11181 Aristotelian essentialism involves a 'natural' or 'causal' interpretation of modal operators [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
11180 Essentialist sentences are not theorems of modal logic, and can even be false [Marcus (Barcan)]
11186 'Essentially' won't replace 'necessarily' for vacuous properties like snub-nosed or self-identical [Marcus (Barcan)]
11185 'Is essentially' has a different meaning from 'is necessarily', as they often cannot be substituted [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
11182 If essences are objects with only essential properties, they are elusive in possible worlds [Marcus (Barcan)]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
11183 The use of possible worlds is to sort properties (not to individuate objects) [Marcus (Barcan)]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
11187 In possible worlds, names are just neutral unvarying pegs for truths and predicates [Marcus (Barcan)]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
12121 We don't assume there is no land, because we can only see sea [Bacon]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
12117 Science moves up and down between inventions of causes, and experiments [Bacon]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
12127 Many different theories will fit the observed facts [Bacon]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
12126 People love (unfortunately) extreme generality, rather than particular knowledge [Bacon]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / g. Contemplation
7071 Life and rationality are pointless if we can only contemplate the freedom of our own ego [Jacobi]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
7072 Jacobi was the first philosopher to talk of nihilism [Jacobi, by Critchley]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
12125 Teleological accounts are fine in metaphysics, but they stop us from searching for the causes [Bacon]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
12118 Essences are part of first philosophy, but as part of nature, not part of logic [Bacon]
11189 Dispositional essences are special, as if an object loses them they cease to exist [Marcus (Barcan)]