33 ideas
12124 | Metaphysics is the best knowledge, because it is the simplest [Bacon] |
12123 | Natural history supports physical knowledge, which supports metaphysical knowledge [Bacon] |
12119 | Physics studies transitory matter; metaphysics what is abstracted and necessary [Bacon] |
12120 | Physics is of material and efficient causes, metaphysics of formal and final causes [Bacon] |
22024 | Fichte's subjectivity struggles to then give any account of objectivity [Pinkard on Fichte] |
22017 | Normativity needs the possibility of negation, in affirmation and denial [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
12184 | Logical necessity overrules all other necessities [McFetridge] |
15083 | The fundamental case of logical necessity is the valid conclusion of an inference [McFetridge, by Hale] |
15084 | In the McFetridge view, logical necessity means a consequent must be true if the antecedent is [McFetridge, by Hale] |
12180 | Logical necessity requires that a valid argument be necessary [McFetridge] |
12181 | Traditionally, logical necessity is the strongest, and entails any other necessities [McFetridge] |
12183 | It is only logical necessity if there is absolutely no sense in which it could be false [McFetridge] |
12192 | The mark of logical necessity is deduction from any suppositions whatever [McFetridge] |
12182 | We assert epistemic possibility without commitment to logical possibility [McFetridge] |
12187 | Objectual modal realists believe in possible worlds; non-objectual ones rest it on the actual world [McFetridge] |
22018 | Necessary truths derive from basic assertion and negation [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
12186 | Modal realists hold that necessities and possibilities are part of the totality of facts [McFetridge] |
22064 | Fichte's logic is much too narrow, and doesn't deduce ethics, art, society or life [Schlegel,F on Fichte] |
22032 | Fichte's key claim was that the subjective-objective distinction must itself be subjective [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
12121 | We don't assume there is no land, because we can only see sea [Bacon] |
12117 | Science moves up and down between inventions of causes, and experiments [Bacon] |
12127 | Many different theories will fit the observed facts [Bacon] |
22020 | We only see ourselves as self-conscious and rational in relation to other rationalities [Fichte] |
12126 | People love (unfortunately) extreme generality, rather than particular knowledge [Bacon] |
22060 | The Self is the spontaneity, self-relatedness and unity needed for knowledge [Fichte, by Siep] |
22066 | Novalis sought a much wider concept of the ego than Fichte's proposal [Novalis on Fichte] |
22016 | The self is not a 'thing', but what emerges from an assertion of normativity [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
22019 | Consciousness of an object always entails awareness of the self [Fichte] |
22061 | Judgement is distinguishing concepts, and seeing their relations [Fichte, by Siep] |
22023 | Fichte's idea of spontaneity implied that nothing counts unless we give it status [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
22065 | Fichte reduces nature to a lifeless immobility [Schlegel,F on Fichte] |
12125 | Teleological accounts are fine in metaphysics, but they stop us from searching for the causes [Bacon] |
12118 | Essences are part of first philosophy, but as part of nature, not part of logic [Bacon] |