48 ideas
12124 | Metaphysics is the best knowledge, because it is the simplest [Bacon] |
14721 | Metaphysical enquiry can survive if its conclusions are tentative [Sider] |
12123 | Natural history supports physical knowledge, which supports metaphysical knowledge [Bacon] |
12119 | Physics studies transitory matter; metaphysics what is abstracted and necessary [Bacon] |
12120 | Physics is of material and efficient causes, metaphysics of formal and final causes [Bacon] |
14760 | Four-dimensionalism sees things and processes as belonging in the same category [Sider] |
14194 | Proper ontology should only use categorical (actual) properties, not hypothetical ones [Sider] |
14745 | If sortal terms fix the kind and the persistence conditions, we need to know what kinds there are [Sider] |
14740 | If Tib is all of Tibbles bar her tail, when Tibbles loses her tail, two different things become one [Sider] |
14752 | Artists 'create' statues because they are essentially statues, and so lack identity with the lump of clay [Sider] |
14743 | The stage view of objects is best for dealing with coincident entities [Sider] |
14747 | 'Composition as identity' says that an object just is the objects which compose it [Sider] |
14757 | Mereological essentialism says an object's parts are necessary for its existence [Sider] |
14727 | Three-dimensionalists assert 'enduring', being wholly present at each moment, and deny 'temporal parts' [Sider] |
14738 | Some might say that its inconsistency with time travel is a reason to favour three-dimensionalism [Sider] |
14726 | Four-dimensionalists assert 'temporal parts', 'perduring', and being spread out over time [Sider] |
14728 | 4D says intrinsic change is difference between successive parts [Sider] |
14729 | 4D says each spatiotemporal object must have a temporal part at every moment at which it exists [Sider] |
14730 | Temporal parts exist, but are not prior building blocks for objects [Sider] |
14762 | Four-dimensionalism says temporal parts are caused (through laws of motion) by previous temporal parts [Sider] |
14731 | Temporal parts are instantaneous [Sider] |
14758 | How can an instantaneous stage believe anything, if beliefs take time? [Sider] |
14741 | The ship undergoes 'asymmetric' fission, where one candidate is seen as stronger [Sider] |
14754 | If you say Leibniz's Law doesn't apply to 'timebound' properties, you are no longer discussing identity [Sider] |
14763 | Counterparts rest on similarity, so there are many such relations in different contexts [Sider] |
12121 | We don't assume there is no land, because we can only see sea [Bacon] |
12117 | Science moves up and down between inventions of causes, and experiments [Bacon] |
12127 | Many different theories will fit the observed facts [Bacon] |
12126 | People love (unfortunately) extreme generality, rather than particular knowledge [Bacon] |
12125 | Teleological accounts are fine in metaphysics, but they stop us from searching for the causes [Bacon] |
8388 | Causation is either direct realism, Humean reduction, non-Humean reduction or theoretical realism [Tooley] |
8389 | Causation distinctions: reductionism/realism; Humean/non-Humean states; observable/non-observable [Tooley] |
8393 | We can only reduce the direction of causation to the direction of time if we are realist about the latter [Tooley] |
8390 | Causation is directly observable in pressure on one's body, and in willed action [Tooley] |
8392 | Probabilist laws are compatible with effects always or never happening [Tooley] |
8399 | The actual cause may not be the most efficacious one [Tooley] |
8391 | In counterfactual worlds there are laws with no instances, so laws aren't supervenient on actuality [Tooley] |
8394 | Explaining causation in terms of laws can't explain the direction of causation [Tooley] |
8398 | Causation is a concept of a relation the same in all worlds, so it can't be a physical process [Tooley] |
12118 | Essences are part of first philosophy, but as part of nature, not part of logic [Bacon] |
14725 | Maybe motion is a dynamical quantity intrinsic to a thing at a particular time [Sider] |
14735 | Space is 3D and lacks a direction; time seems connected to causation [Sider] |
14722 | Between presentism and eternalism is the 'growing block' view - the past is real, the future is not [Sider] |
14724 | Presentists must deny truths about multiple times [Sider] |
14756 | For Presentists there must always be a temporal vantage point for any description [Sider] |
14723 | Talk using tenses can be eliminated, by reducing it to indexical connections for an utterance [Sider] |
14734 | The B-series involves eternalism, and the reduction of tense [Sider] |
14736 | The B-theory is adequate, except that it omits to say which time is present [Sider] |