59 ideas
12124 | Metaphysics is the best knowledge, because it is the simplest [Bacon] |
12123 | Natural history supports physical knowledge, which supports metaphysical knowledge [Bacon] |
12119 | Physics studies transitory matter; metaphysics what is abstracted and necessary [Bacon] |
12120 | Physics is of material and efficient causes, metaphysics of formal and final causes [Bacon] |
11832 | We learn a concept's relations by using it, without reducing it to anything [Wiggins] |
14239 | The empty set is usually derived from Separation, but it also seems to need Infinity [Oliver/Smiley] |
14240 | The empty set is something, not nothing! [Oliver/Smiley] |
14241 | We don't need the empty set to express non-existence, as there are other ways to do that [Oliver/Smiley] |
14242 | Maybe we can treat the empty set symbol as just meaning an empty term [Oliver/Smiley] |
14243 | The unit set may be needed to express intersections that leave a single member [Oliver/Smiley] |
11863 | (λx)[Man x] means 'the property x has iff x is a man'. [Wiggins] |
14234 | If you only refer to objects one at a time, you need sets in order to refer to a plurality [Oliver/Smiley] |
14237 | We can use plural language to refer to the set theory domain, to avoid calling it a 'set' [Oliver/Smiley] |
14245 | Logical truths are true no matter what exists - but predicate calculus insists that something exists [Oliver/Smiley] |
14246 | If mathematics purely concerned mathematical objects, there would be no applied mathematics [Oliver/Smiley] |
14247 | Sets might either represent the numbers, or be the numbers, or replace the numbers [Oliver/Smiley] |
14746 | What exists can't depend on our conceptual scheme, and using all conceptual schemes is too liberal [Sider on Wiggins] |
11900 | We can accept criteria of distinctness and persistence, without making the counterfactual claims [Mackie,P on Wiggins] |
11870 | Activity individuates natural things, functions do artefacts, and intentions do artworks [Wiggins] |
11866 | The idea of 'thisness' is better expressed with designation/predication and particular/universal [Wiggins] |
11896 | A sortal essence is a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P] |
15835 | Wiggins's sortal essentialism rests on a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P] |
11841 | The evening star is the same planet but not the same star as the morning star, since it is not a star [Wiggins] |
10679 | 'Sortalism' says parts only compose a whole if it falls under a sort or kind [Wiggins, by Hossack] |
14363 | Identity a=b is only possible with some concept to give persistence and existence conditions [Wiggins, by Strawson,P] |
14364 | A thing is necessarily its highest sortal kind, which entails an essential constitution [Wiggins, by Strawson,P] |
11851 | Many predicates are purely generic, or pure determiners, rather than sortals [Wiggins] |
11865 | The possibility of a property needs an essential sortal concept to conceive it [Wiggins] |
14744 | Objects can only coincide if they are of different kinds; trees can't coincide with other trees [Wiggins, by Sider] |
11852 | Is the Pope's crown one crown, if it is made of many crowns? [Wiggins] |
11875 | Boundaries are not crucial to mountains, so they are determinate without a determinate extent [Wiggins] |
14749 | Identity is an atemporal relation, but composition is relative to times [Wiggins, by Sider] |
11844 | If I destroy an item, I do not destroy each part of it [Wiggins] |
11861 | We can forget about individual or particularized essences [Wiggins] |
11871 | Essences are not explanations, but individuations [Wiggins] |
11879 | Essentialism is best represented as a predicate-modifier: □(a exists → a is F) [Wiggins, by Mackie,P] |
11835 | The nominal essence is the idea behind a name used for sorting [Wiggins] |
11876 | It is easier to go from horses to horse-stages than from horse-stages to horses [Wiggins] |
11858 | The question is not what gets the title 'Theseus' Ship', but what is identical with the original [Wiggins] |
11843 | Identity over a time and at a time aren't different concepts [Wiggins] |
11864 | Hesperus=Hesperus, and Phosphorus=Hesperus, so necessarily Phosphorus=Hesperus [Wiggins] |
11831 | The formal properties of identity are reflexivity and Leibniz's Law [Wiggins] |
14362 | Relative Identity is incompatible with the Indiscernibility of Identicals [Wiggins, by Strawson,P] |
11838 | Relativity of Identity makes identity entirely depend on a category [Wiggins] |
11847 | To identify two items, we must have a common sort for them [Wiggins] |
11839 | Do both 'same f as' and '=' support Leibniz's Law? [Wiggins] |
11845 | Substitutivity, and hence most reasoning, needs Leibniz's Law [Wiggins] |
11869 | Possible worlds rest on the objects about which we have suppositions [Wiggins] |
11850 | Not every story corresponds to a possible world [Wiggins] |
12121 | We don't assume there is no land, because we can only see sea [Bacon] |
12117 | Science moves up and down between inventions of causes, and experiments [Bacon] |
12127 | Many different theories will fit the observed facts [Bacon] |
11848 | Asking 'what is it?' nicely points us to the persistence of a continuing entity [Wiggins] |
12126 | People love (unfortunately) extreme generality, rather than particular knowledge [Bacon] |
11859 | The mind conceptualizes objects; yet objects impinge upon the mind [Wiggins] |
11836 | We can use 'concept' for the reference, and 'conception' for sense [Wiggins] |
12125 | Teleological accounts are fine in metaphysics, but they stop us from searching for the causes [Bacon] |
11860 | Lawlike propensities are enough to individuate natural kinds [Wiggins] |
12118 | Essences are part of first philosophy, but as part of nature, not part of logic [Bacon] |