20 ideas
12124 | Metaphysics is the best knowledge, because it is the simplest [Bacon] |
12123 | Natural history supports physical knowledge, which supports metaphysical knowledge [Bacon] |
12119 | Physics studies transitory matter; metaphysics what is abstracted and necessary [Bacon] |
12120 | Physics is of material and efficient causes, metaphysics of formal and final causes [Bacon] |
14347 | A 'finkish' disposition is one that is lost immediately after the appropriate stimulus [Corry] |
14348 | An 'antidote' allows a manifestation to begin, but then blocks it [Corry] |
14350 | If a disposition is never instantiated, it shouldn't be part of our theory of nature [Corry] |
12580 | Experiences have no conceptual content [Evans, by Greco] |
7643 | We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour [Evans] |
12121 | We don't assume there is no land, because we can only see sea [Bacon] |
12117 | Science moves up and down between inventions of causes, and experiments [Bacon] |
14351 | Maybe an experiment unmasks an essential disposition, and reveals its regularities [Corry] |
12127 | Many different theories will fit the observed facts [Bacon] |
12126 | People love (unfortunately) extreme generality, rather than particular knowledge [Bacon] |
23794 | Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual [Evans, by Schulte] |
16366 | The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything [Evans] |
12575 | Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them [Evans, by Peacocke] |
12125 | Teleological accounts are fine in metaphysics, but they stop us from searching for the causes [Bacon] |
14346 | Dispositional essentialism says fundamental laws of nature are strict, not ceteris paribus [Corry] |
12118 | Essences are part of first philosophy, but as part of nature, not part of logic [Bacon] |