Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Advancement of Learning', 'works' and 'Explanation and Reference'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

17 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
12124 Metaphysics is the best knowledge, because it is the simplest [Bacon]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
12123 Natural history supports physical knowledge, which supports metaphysical knowledge [Bacon]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
12119 Physics studies transitory matter; metaphysics what is abstracted and necessary [Bacon]
12120 Physics is of material and efficient causes, metaphysics of formal and final causes [Bacon]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
17505 Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions [Putnam]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
11908 Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties [Mackie,P on Putnam]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
10994 Conditionals are true if minimal revision of the antecedent verifies the consequent [Stalnaker, by Read]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
12121 We don't assume there is no land, because we can only see sea [Bacon]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
12117 Science moves up and down between inventions of causes, and experiments [Bacon]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
17508 Science aims at truth, not at 'simplicity' [Putnam]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
12127 Many different theories will fit the observed facts [Bacon]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
12126 People love (unfortunately) extreme generality, rather than particular knowledge [Bacon]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
17506 I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
12125 Teleological accounts are fine in metaphysics, but they stop us from searching for the causes [Bacon]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
17507 Natural kind stereotypes are 'strong' (obvious, like tiger) or 'weak' (obscure, like molybdenum) [Putnam]
11904 Express natural kinds as a posteriori predicate connections, not as singular terms [Putnam, by Mackie,P]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
12118 Essences are part of first philosophy, but as part of nature, not part of logic [Bacon]