56 ideas
| 21463 | Hamann, Herder and Jacobi were key opponents of the Enlightenment [Gardner] |
| 21459 | Kant halted rationalism, and forced empiricists to worry about foundations [Gardner] |
| 19250 | Everything interesting should be recorded, with records that can be rearranged [Peirce] |
| 19228 | Sciences concern existence, but philosophy also concerns potential existence [Peirce] |
| 19241 | An idea on its own isn't an idea, because they are continuous systems [Peirce] |
| 19227 | Philosophy is a search for real truth [Peirce] |
| 19218 | Metaphysics is pointless without exact modern logic [Peirce] |
| 12124 | Metaphysics is the best knowledge, because it is the simplest [Bacon] |
| 21460 | Only Kant and Hegel have united nature, morals, politics, aesthetics and religion [Gardner] |
| 12123 | Natural history supports physical knowledge, which supports metaphysical knowledge [Bacon] |
| 12119 | Physics studies transitory matter; metaphysics what is abstracted and necessary [Bacon] |
| 12120 | Physics is of material and efficient causes, metaphysics of formal and final causes [Bacon] |
| 19229 | Metaphysics is the science of both experience, and its general laws and types [Peirce] |
| 19219 | Metaphysical reasoning is simple enough, but the concepts are very hard [Peirce] |
| 19231 | Metaphysics is turning into logic, and logic is becoming mathematics [Peirce] |
| 21443 | Transcendental proofs derive necessities from possibilities (e.g. possibility of experiencing objects) [Gardner] |
| 19247 | The one unpardonable offence in reasoning is to block the route to further truth [Peirce] |
| 19246 | 'Holding for true' is either practical commitment, or provisional theory [Peirce] |
| 19237 | Deduction is true when the premises facts necessarily make the conclusion fact true [Peirce] |
| 19256 | Our research always hopes that reality embodies the logic we are employing [Peirce] |
| 19238 | The logic of relatives relies on objects built of any relations (rather than on classes) [Peirce] |
| 21444 | Modern geoemtry is either 'pure' (and formal), or 'applied' (and a posteriori) [Gardner] |
| 19226 | We now know that mathematics only studies hypotheses, not facts [Peirce] |
| 21453 | Leibnizian monads qualify as Kantian noumena [Gardner] |
| 19240 | Realism is the belief that there is something in the being of things corresponding to our reasoning [Peirce] |
| 19239 | There may be no reality; it's just our one desperate hope of knowing anything [Peirce] |
| 19252 | Objective chance is the property of a distribution [Peirce] |
| 19232 | In ordinary language a conditional statement assumes that the antecedent is true [Peirce] |
| 19223 | We act on 'full belief' in a crisis, but 'opinion' only operates for trivial actions [Peirce] |
| 12121 | We don't assume there is no land, because we can only see sea [Bacon] |
| 19253 | We talk of 'association by resemblance' but that is wrong: the association constitutes the resemblance [Peirce] |
| 19224 | Scientists will give up any conclusion, if experience opposes it [Peirce] |
| 19243 | If each inference slightly reduced our certainty, science would soon be in trouble [Peirce] |
| 12117 | Science moves up and down between inventions of causes, and experiments [Bacon] |
| 19225 | I classify science by level of abstraction; principles derive from above, and data from below [Peirce] |
| 12127 | Many different theories will fit the observed facts [Bacon] |
| 19234 | 'Induction' doesn't capture Greek 'epagoge', which is singulars in a mass producing the general [Peirce] |
| 19235 | How does induction get started? [Peirce] |
| 19236 | Induction can never prove that laws have no exceptions [Peirce] |
| 19251 | The worst fallacy in induction is generalising one recondite property from a sample [Peirce] |
| 19222 | Men often answer inner 'whys' by treating unconscious instincts as if they were reasons [Peirce] |
| 19220 | We may think animals reason very little, but they hardly ever make mistakes! [Peirce] |
| 19255 | Generalisation is the great law of mind [Peirce] |
| 12126 | People love (unfortunately) extreme generality, rather than particular knowledge [Bacon] |
| 19242 | Generalization is the true end of life [Peirce] |
| 19249 | 'Know yourself' is not introspection; it is grasping how others see you [Peirce] |
| 19257 | Whatever is First must be sentient [Peirce] |
| 19248 | Reasoning involves observation, experiment, and habituation [Peirce] |
| 19221 | Everybody overrates their own reasoning, so it is clearly superficial [Peirce] |
| 19233 | Indexicals are unusual words, because they stimulate the hearer to look around [Peirce] |
| 19230 | People should follow what lies before them, and is within their power [Peirce] |
| 19245 | We are not inspired by other people's knowledge; a sense of our ignorance motivates study [Peirce] |
| 12125 | Teleological accounts are fine in metaphysics, but they stop us from searching for the causes [Bacon] |
| 19244 | Chemists rely on a single experiment to establish a fact; repetition is pointless [Peirce] |
| 19254 | Our laws of nature may be the result of evolution [Peirce] |
| 12118 | Essences are part of first philosophy, but as part of nature, not part of logic [Bacon] |