Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good', 'The Value Problem' and 'Tropes'

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20 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom has a higher value than understanding, which has a higher value than knowledge [Greco]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
We might treat both tropes and substances as fundamental, so we can't presume it is just tropes [Daly]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
More than one trope (even identical ones!) can occupy the same location [Daly]
If tropes are linked by the existence of concurrence, a special relation is needed to link them all [Daly]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
If value is practical, knowledge is no better than true opinion [Greco]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
Externalist theories don't explain why knowledge has value [Greco]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Reason is too slow and doubtful to guide all actions, which need external and moral senses [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
We approve of actions by a superior moral sense [Hutcheson]
We dislike a traitor, even if they give us great benefit [Hutcheson]
The moral sense is not an innate idea, but an ability to approve or disapprove in a disinterested way [Hutcheson]
We cannot choose our moral feelings, otherwise bribery could affect them [Hutcheson]
Everyone feels uneasy when seeing others in pain, unless the others are evil [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
Human nature seems incapable of universal malice, except what results from self-love [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
As death approaches, why do we still care about family, friends or country? [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
My action is not made good by a good effect, if I did not foresee and intend it [Hutcheson]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Contempt of danger is just madness if it is not in some worthy cause [Hutcheson]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
That action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest number [Hutcheson]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
The loss of perfect rights causes misery, but the loss of imperfect rights reduces social good [Hutcheson]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
We say God is good if we think everything he does aims at the happiness of his creatures [Hutcheson]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
If goodness is constituted by God's will, it is a tautology to say God's will is good [Hutcheson]