48 ideas
| 3811 | Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity [Searle] |
| 6253 | Reason is our power of finding out true propositions [Hutcheson] |
| 3822 | Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason [Searle] |
| 3806 | Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression [Searle] |
| 3812 | Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality [Searle] |
| 3745 | Must sentences make statements to qualify for truth? [O'Connor] |
| 3742 | Beliefs must match facts, but also words must match beliefs [O'Connor] |
| 3744 | The semantic theory requires sentences as truth-bearers, not propositions [O'Connor] |
| 3749 | What does 'true in English' mean? [O'Connor] |
| 3809 | If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic [Searle] |
| 3746 | Logic seems to work for unasserted sentences [O'Connor] |
| 3810 | In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax [Searle] |
| 3747 | Events are fast changes which are of interest to us [O'Connor] |
| 3841 | Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings [Searle] |
| 3743 | We can't contemplate our beliefs until we have expressed them [O'Connor] |
| 3748 | Without language our beliefs are particular and present [O'Connor] |
| 3833 | A belief is a commitment to truth [Searle] |
| 3837 | We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth [Searle] |
| 3816 | Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief) [Searle] |
| 3828 | Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it" [Searle] |
| 3831 | Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states [Searle] |
| 3830 | In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it [Searle] |
| 3832 | Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events) [Searle] |
| 3823 | Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity [Searle] |
| 3821 | Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self [Searle] |
| 3824 | A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action [Searle] |
| 3834 | An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self [Searle] |
| 3825 | Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't [Searle] |
| 3829 | Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible [Searle] |
| 3826 | A self must at least be capable of consciousness [Searle] |
| 3827 | The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced [Searle] |
| 3820 | The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally [Searle] |
| 3817 | Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action [Searle] |
| 3808 | Rational decision making presupposes free will [Searle] |
| 3818 | We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective [Searle] |
| 3814 | Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it [Searle] |
| 3840 | We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable [Searle] |
| 3815 | The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action [Searle] |
| 3839 | Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act [Searle] |
| 6256 | Can't the moral sense make mistakes, as the other senses do? [Hutcheson] |
| 3835 | If it is true, you ought to believe it [Searle] |
| 3836 | If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men [Searle] |
| 6252 | Happiness is a pleasant sensation, or continued state of such sensations [Hutcheson] |
| 3838 | Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution [Searle] |
| 6257 | You can't form moral rules without an end, which needs feelings and a moral sense [Hutcheson] |
| 3813 | 'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something [Searle] |
| 6254 | We are asked to follow God's ends because he is our benefactor, but why must we do that? [Hutcheson] |
| 6255 | Why may God not have a superior moral sense very similar to ours? [Hutcheson] |