Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Treatise 4: The Moral Sense', 'Knowledge and the Philosophy of Number' and 'Individuation'

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18 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Reason is our power of finding out true propositions [Hutcheson]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
Predicativism says only predicated sets exist [Hossack]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
The iterative conception has to appropriate Replacement, to justify the ordinals [Hossack]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / f. Limitation of Size
Limitation of Size justifies Replacement, but then has to appropriate Power Set [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
The connective 'and' can have an order-sensitive meaning, as 'and then' [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
'Before' and 'after' are not two relations, but one relation with two orders [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / h. Ordinal infinity
Transfinite ordinals are needed in proof theory, and for recursive functions and computability [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
Numbers are properties, not sets (because numbers are magnitudes) [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
We can only mentally construct potential infinities, but maths needs actual infinities [Hossack]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
Not all predicates can be properties - 'is non-self-exemplifying', for example [Lowe]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Neither mere matter nor pure form can individuate a sphere, so it must be a combination [Lowe]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / c. Direction of explanation
If the flagpole causally explains the shadow, the shadow cannot explain the flagpole [Lowe]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Properties are facets of objects, only discussable separately by an act of abstraction [Lowe]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Can't the moral sense make mistakes, as the other senses do? [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Happiness is a pleasant sensation, or continued state of such sensations [Hutcheson]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
You can't form moral rules without an end, which needs feelings and a moral sense [Hutcheson]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
We are asked to follow God's ends because he is our benefactor, but why must we do that? [Hutcheson]
Why may God not have a superior moral sense very similar to ours? [Hutcheson]