18 ideas
6253 | Reason is our power of finding out true propositions [Hutcheson] |
23623 | Predicativism says only predicated sets exist [Hossack] |
23624 | The iterative conception has to appropriate Replacement, to justify the ordinals [Hossack] |
23625 | Limitation of Size justifies Replacement, but then has to appropriate Power Set [Hossack] |
23628 | The connective 'and' can have an order-sensitive meaning, as 'and then' [Hossack] |
23627 | 'Before' and 'after' are not two relations, but one relation with two orders [Hossack] |
23626 | Transfinite ordinals are needed in proof theory, and for recursive functions and computability [Hossack] |
23621 | Numbers are properties, not sets (because numbers are magnitudes) [Hossack] |
23622 | We can only mentally construct potential infinities, but maths needs actual infinities [Hossack] |
8967 | Not all predicates can be properties - 'is non-self-exemplifying', for example [Lowe] |
8965 | Neither mere matter nor pure form can individuate a sphere, so it must be a combination [Lowe] |
8968 | If the flagpole causally explains the shadow, the shadow cannot explain the flagpole [Lowe] |
8966 | Properties are facets of objects, only discussable separately by an act of abstraction [Lowe] |
6256 | Can't the moral sense make mistakes, as the other senses do? [Hutcheson] |
6252 | Happiness is a pleasant sensation, or continued state of such sensations [Hutcheson] |
6257 | You can't form moral rules without an end, which needs feelings and a moral sense [Hutcheson] |
6254 | We are asked to follow God's ends because he is our benefactor, but why must we do that? [Hutcheson] |
6255 | Why may God not have a superior moral sense very similar to ours? [Hutcheson] |