Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Treatise 4: The Moral Sense', 'A Version of Internalist Foundationalism' and 'Fallibilism'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


20 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Reason is our power of finding out true propositions [Hutcheson]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
For any given area, there seem to be a huge number of possible coherent systems of beliefs [Bonjour]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
The concept of knowledge is so confused that it is best avoided [Bonjour]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
Fallibilism is consistent with dogmatism or scepticism, and is not alternative to them [Dougherty]
It is best to see the fallibility in the reasons, rather than in the agents or the knowledge [Dougherty]
We can't normally say that we know something 'but it might be false' [Dougherty]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
It is hard to give the concept of 'self-evident' a clear and defensible characterization [Bonjour]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
The adverbial account will still be needed when a mind apprehends its sense-data [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
Conscious states have built-in awareness of content, so we know if a conceptual description of it is correct [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
My incoherent beliefs about art should not undermine my very coherent beliefs about physics [Bonjour]
Coherence seems to justify empirical beliefs about externals when there is no external input [Bonjour]
Coherentists must give a reason why coherent justification is likely to lead to the truth [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Reliabilists disagree over whether some further requirement is needed to produce knowledge [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
If the reliable facts producing a belief are unknown to me, my belief is not rational or responsible [Bonjour]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
If neither the first-level nor the second-level is itself conscious, there seems to be no consciousness present [Bonjour]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Can't the moral sense make mistakes, as the other senses do? [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Happiness is a pleasant sensation, or continued state of such sensations [Hutcheson]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
You can't form moral rules without an end, which needs feelings and a moral sense [Hutcheson]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
We are asked to follow God's ends because he is our benefactor, but why must we do that? [Hutcheson]
Why may God not have a superior moral sense very similar to ours? [Hutcheson]