20 ideas
6253 | Reason is our power of finding out true propositions [Hutcheson] |
14650 | Maybe proper names involve essentialism [Plantinga] |
14648 | Could I name all of the real numbers in one fell swoop? Call them all 'Charley'? [Plantinga] |
14647 | Surely self-identity is essential to Socrates? [Plantinga] |
14646 | An object has a property essentially if it couldn't conceivably have lacked it [Plantinga] |
14649 | Can we find an appropriate 'de dicto' paraphrase for any 'de re' proposition? [Plantinga] |
14642 | Expressing modality about a statement is 'de dicto'; expressing it of property-possession is 'de re' [Plantinga] |
14643 | 'De dicto' true and 'de re' false is possible, and so is 'de dicto' false and 'de re' true [Plantinga] |
14651 | What Socrates could have been, and could have become, are different? [Plantinga] |
20400 | Intentions either succeed or fail, so external evidence for them is always irrelevant [Wimsatt/Beardsley, by Davies,S] |
7266 | The author's intentions are irrelevant to the judgement of a work's success [Wimsatt/Beardsley] |
7267 | Poetry, unlike messages, can be successful without communicating intentions [Wimsatt/Beardsley] |
7268 | The thoughts of a poem should be imputed to the dramatic speaker, and hardly at all to the poet [Wimsatt/Beardsley] |
7269 | The intentional fallacy is a romantic one [Wimsatt/Beardsley] |
7271 | Biography can reveal meanings and dramatic character, as well as possible intentions [Wimsatt/Beardsley] |
6256 | Can't the moral sense make mistakes, as the other senses do? [Hutcheson] |
6252 | Happiness is a pleasant sensation, or continued state of such sensations [Hutcheson] |
6257 | You can't form moral rules without an end, which needs feelings and a moral sense [Hutcheson] |
6254 | We are asked to follow God's ends because he is our benefactor, but why must we do that? [Hutcheson] |
6255 | Why may God not have a superior moral sense very similar to ours? [Hutcheson] |