37 ideas
| 15053 | If metaphysics can't be settled, it hardly matters whether it makes sense [Fine,K] |
| 15054 | 'Quietist' says abandon metaphysics because answers are unattainable (as in Kant's noumenon) [Fine,K] |
| 8447 | In 'Etna is higher than Vesuvius' the whole of Etna, including all the lava, can't be the reference [Frege] |
| 8448 | Any object can have many different names, each with a distinct sense [Frege] |
| 15007 | If you make 'grounding' fundamental, you have to mention some non-fundamental notions [Sider on Fine,K] |
| 15006 | Something is grounded when it holds, and is explained, and necessitated by something else [Fine,K, by Sider] |
| 15055 | Grounding relations are best expressed as relations between sentences [Fine,K] |
| 15050 | Reduction might be producing a sentence which gets closer to the logical form [Fine,K] |
| 15051 | Reduction might be semantic, where a reduced sentence is understood through its reduction [Fine,K] |
| 15052 | Reduction is modal, if the reductions necessarily entail the truth of the target sentence [Fine,K] |
| 15056 | The notion of reduction (unlike that of 'ground') implies the unreality of what is reduced [Fine,K] |
| 15047 | What is real can only be settled in terms of 'ground' [Fine,K] |
| 15046 | Reality is a primitive metaphysical concept, which cannot be understood in other terms [Fine,K] |
| 15060 | Why should what is explanatorily basic be therefore more real? [Fine,K] |
| 15048 | In metaphysics, reality is regarded as either 'factual', or as 'fundamental' [Fine,K] |
| 16665 | There are entities, and then positive 'modes', modifying aspects outside the thing's essence [Suárez] |
| 16666 | A mode determines the state and character of a quantity, without adding to it [Suárez] |
| 16667 | Substances are incomplete unless they have modes [Suárez, by Pasnau] |
| 17007 | Forms must rule over faculties and accidents, and are the source of action and unity [Suárez] |
| 16780 | Partial forms of leaf and fruit are united in the whole form of the tree [Suárez] |
| 16758 | The best support for substantial forms is the co-ordinated unity of a natural being [Suárez] |
| 16743 | We can get at the essential nature of 'quantity' by knowing bulk and extension [Suárez] |
| 16742 | We only know essences through non-essential features, esp. those closest to the essence [Suárez] |
| 22143 | Identity does not exclude possible or imagined difference [Suárez, by Boulter] |
| 22144 | Real Essential distinction: A and B are of different natural kinds [Suárez, by Boulter] |
| 22146 | Minor Real distinction: B needs A, but A doesn't need B [Suárez, by Boulter] |
| 22145 | Major Real distinction: A and B have independent existences [Suárez, by Boulter] |
| 22147 | Conceptual/Mental distinction: one thing can be conceived of in two different ways [Suárez, by Boulter] |
| 22148 | Modal distinction: A isn't B or its property, but still needs B [Suárez, by Boulter] |
| 22149 | Scholastics assess possibility by what has actually happened in reality [Suárez, by Boulter] |
| 15061 | Although colour depends on us, we can describe the world that way if it picks out fundamentals [Fine,K] |
| 15059 | Grounding is an explanation of truth, and needs all the virtues of good explanations [Fine,K] |
| 15057 | Ultimate explanations are in 'grounds', which account for other truths, which hold in virtue of the grounding [Fine,K] |
| 8446 | We understand new propositions by constructing their sense from the words [Frege] |
| 8449 | Senses can't be subjective, because propositions would be private, and disagreement impossible [Frege] |
| 15058 | A proposition ingredient is 'essential' if changing it would change the truth-value [Fine,K] |
| 16682 | Other things could occupy the same location as an angel [Suárez] |