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All the ideas for 'Disputationes metaphysicae', 'The Metaphysics of Modality' and 'Structure and Nature'

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43 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
12027 There must be a plausible epistemological theory alongside any metaphysical theory [Forbes,G]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / a. Symbols of PL
12005 The symbol 'ι' forms definite descriptions; (ιx)F(x) says 'the x which is such that F(x)' [Forbes,G]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
12010 Is the meaning of 'and' given by its truth table, or by its introduction and elimination rules? [Forbes,G]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
10242 I apply structuralism to concrete and abstract objects indiscriminately [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
10243 My ontology is quarks etc., classes of such things, classes of such classes etc. [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
12023 Vagueness problems arise from applying sharp semantics to vague languages [Forbes,G]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
16665 There are entities, and then positive 'modes', modifying aspects outside the thing's essence [Suárez]
16666 A mode determines the state and character of a quantity, without adding to it [Suárez]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
12017 In all instances of identity, there must be some facts to ensure the identity [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
16667 Substances are incomplete unless they have modes [Suárez, by Pasnau]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
12024 If we combined two clocks, it seems that two clocks may have become one clock. [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
17007 Forms must rule over faculties and accidents, and are the source of action and unity [Suárez]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
16780 Partial forms of leaf and fruit are united in the whole form of the tree [Suárez]
16758 The best support for substantial forms is the co-ordinated unity of a natural being [Suárez]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object
16743 We can get at the essential nature of 'quantity' by knowing bulk and extension [Suárez]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
11885 Only individual essences will ground identities across worlds in other properties [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P]
12014 An individual essence is a set of essential properties which only that object can have [Forbes,G]
12015 Non-trivial individual essence is properties other than de dicto, or universal, or relational [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
12013 Essential properties depend on a category, and perhaps also on particular facts [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
12012 Essential properties are those without which an object could not exist [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
12022 Same parts does not ensure same artefact, if those parts could constitute a different artefact [Forbes,G]
12025 Artefacts have fuzzy essences [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
16742 We only know essences through non-essential features, esp. those closest to the essence [Suárez]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
12020 An individual might change their sex in a world, but couldn't have differed in sex at origin [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
22143 Identity does not exclude possible or imagined difference [Suárez, by Boulter]
22144 Real Essential distinction: A and B are of different natural kinds [Suárez, by Boulter]
22146 Minor Real distinction: B needs A, but A doesn't need B [Suárez, by Boulter]
22145 Major Real distinction: A and B have independent existences [Suárez, by Boulter]
22147 Conceptual/Mental distinction: one thing can be conceived of in two different ways [Suárez, by Boulter]
22148 Modal distinction: A isn't B or its property, but still needs B [Suárez, by Boulter]
11888 Identities must hold because of other facts, which must be instrinsic [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
12003 De re modal formulae, unlike de dicto, are sensitive to transworld identities [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
12028 De re necessity is a form of conceptual necessity, just as de dicto necessity is [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
22149 Scholastics assess possibility by what has actually happened in reality [Suárez, by Boulter]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
12008 Unlike places and times, we cannot separate possible worlds from what is true at them [Forbes,G]
12009 The problem with possible worlds realism is epistemological; we can't know properties of possible objects [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
12007 Possible worlds are points of logical space, rather like other times than our own [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
12011 Transworld identity concerns the limits of possibility for ordinary things [Forbes,G]
12016 The problem of transworld identity can be solved by individual essences [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
12004 Counterpart theory is not good at handling the logic of identity [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
12021 Haecceitism attributes to each individual a primitive identity or thisness [Forbes,G]
12029 We believe in thisnesses, because we reject bizarre possibilities as not being about that individual [Forbes,G]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / c. Angels
16682 Other things could occupy the same location as an angel [Suárez]