28 ideas
21463 | Hamann, Herder and Jacobi were key opponents of the Enlightenment [Gardner] |
21459 | Kant halted rationalism, and forced empiricists to worry about foundations [Gardner] |
21460 | Only Kant and Hegel have united nature, morals, politics, aesthetics and religion [Gardner] |
12302 | Definitions formed an abstract hierarchy for Aristotle, as sets do for us [Fine,K] |
14266 | Aristotle sees hierarchies in definitions using genus and differentia (as we see them in sets) [Fine,K] |
21443 | Transcendental proofs derive necessities from possibilities (e.g. possibility of experiencing objects) [Gardner] |
21444 | Modern geoemtry is either 'pure' (and formal), or 'applied' (and a posteriori) [Gardner] |
14268 | Maybe bottom-up grounding shows constitution, and top-down grounding shows essence [Fine,K] |
21453 | Leibnizian monads qualify as Kantian noumena [Gardner] |
16665 | There are entities, and then positive 'modes', modifying aspects outside the thing's essence [Suárez] |
16666 | A mode determines the state and character of a quantity, without adding to it [Suárez] |
16667 | Substances are incomplete unless they have modes [Suárez, by Pasnau] |
17007 | Forms must rule over faculties and accidents, and are the source of action and unity [Suárez] |
16780 | Partial forms of leaf and fruit are united in the whole form of the tree [Suárez] |
16758 | The best support for substantial forms is the co-ordinated unity of a natural being [Suárez] |
16743 | We can get at the essential nature of 'quantity' by knowing bulk and extension [Suárez] |
14267 | There is no distinctive idea of constitution, because you can't say constitution begins and ends [Fine,K] |
14264 | Is there a plausible Aristotelian notion of constitution, applicable to both physical and non-physical? [Fine,K] |
16742 | We only know essences through non-essential features, esp. those closest to the essence [Suárez] |
22143 | Identity does not exclude possible or imagined difference [Suárez, by Boulter] |
22144 | Real Essential distinction: A and B are of different natural kinds [Suárez, by Boulter] |
22146 | Minor Real distinction: B needs A, but A doesn't need B [Suárez, by Boulter] |
22145 | Major Real distinction: A and B have independent existences [Suárez, by Boulter] |
22147 | Conceptual/Mental distinction: one thing can be conceived of in two different ways [Suárez, by Boulter] |
22148 | Modal distinction: A isn't B or its property, but still needs B [Suárez, by Boulter] |
22149 | Scholastics assess possibility by what has actually happened in reality [Suárez, by Boulter] |
14265 | The components of abstract definitions could play the same role as matter for physical objects [Fine,K] |
16682 | Other things could occupy the same location as an angel [Suárez] |