61 ideas
4986 | A weaker kind of reductionism than direct translation is the use of 'bridge laws' [Kirk,R] |
16665 | There are entities, and then positive 'modes', modifying aspects outside the thing's essence [Suárez] |
16666 | A mode determines the state and character of a quantity, without adding to it [Suárez] |
16667 | Substances are incomplete unless they have modes [Suárez, by Pasnau] |
17007 | Forms must rule over faculties and accidents, and are the source of action and unity [Suárez] |
16780 | Partial forms of leaf and fruit are united in the whole form of the tree [Suárez] |
16758 | The best support for substantial forms is the co-ordinated unity of a natural being [Suárez] |
16743 | We can get at the essential nature of 'quantity' by knowing bulk and extension [Suárez] |
16742 | We only know essences through non-essential features, esp. those closest to the essence [Suárez] |
22143 | Identity does not exclude possible or imagined difference [Suárez, by Boulter] |
22144 | Real Essential distinction: A and B are of different natural kinds [Suárez, by Boulter] |
22146 | Minor Real distinction: B needs A, but A doesn't need B [Suárez, by Boulter] |
22145 | Major Real distinction: A and B have independent existences [Suárez, by Boulter] |
22147 | Conceptual/Mental distinction: one thing can be conceived of in two different ways [Suárez, by Boulter] |
22148 | Modal distinction: A isn't B or its property, but still needs B [Suárez, by Boulter] |
22149 | Scholastics assess possibility by what has actually happened in reality [Suárez, by Boulter] |
5001 | Maybe we should see intentionality and consciousness as a single problem, not two [Kirk,R] |
4993 | If a bird captures a worm, we could say its behaviour is 'about' the worm [Kirk,R] |
5000 | Behaviourism says intentionality is an external relation; language of thought says it's internal [Kirk,R] |
4363 | The word 'person' is useless in ethics, because what counts as a good or bad self-conscious being? [Hursthouse] |
4982 | Dualism implies some brain events with no physical cause, and others with no physical effect [Kirk,R] |
4991 | Behaviourism seems a good theory for intentional states, but bad for phenomenal ones [Kirk,R] |
4994 | Behaviourism offers a good alternative to simplistic unitary accounts of mental relationships [Kirk,R] |
4992 | In 'holistic' behaviourism we say a mental state is a complex of many dispositions [Kirk,R] |
4990 | The inverted spectrum idea is often regarded as an objection to behaviourism [Kirk,R] |
4984 | All meaningful psychological statements can be translated into physics [Kirk,R] |
4998 | Instead of representation by sentences, it can be by a distribution of connectionist strengths [Kirk,R] |
4985 | If mental states are multiply realisable, they could not be translated into physical terms [Kirk,R] |
4997 | It seems unlikely that most concepts are innate, if a theory must be understood to grasp them [Kirk,R] |
4999 | For behaviourists language is just a special kind of behaviour [Kirk,R] |
4995 | Behaviourists doubt whether reference is a single type of relation [Kirk,R] |
4355 | There may be inverse akrasia, where the agent's action is better than their judgement recommends [Hursthouse] |
4325 | Must all actions be caused in part by a desire, or can a belief on its own be sufficient? [Hursthouse] |
4351 | It is a fantasy that only through the study of philosophy can one become virtuous [Hursthouse] |
4340 | You are not a dishonest person if a tragic dilemma forces you to do something dishonest [Hursthouse] |
4329 | After a moral dilemma is resolved there is still a 'remainder', requiring (say) regret [Hursthouse] |
4330 | Deontologists resolve moral dilemmas by saying the rule conflict is merely apparent [Hursthouse] |
4341 | Involuntary actions performed in tragic dilemmas are bad because they mar a good life [Hursthouse] |
4358 | Virtue may be neither sufficient nor necessary for eudaimonia [Hursthouse] |
4337 | Teenagers are often quite wise about ideals, but rather stupid about consequences [Hursthouse] |
4324 | Animals and plants can 'flourish', but only rational beings can have eudaimonia [Hursthouse] |
4359 | When it comes to bringing up children, most of us think that the virtues are the best bet [Hursthouse] |
4336 | Any strict ranking of virtues or rules gets abandoned when faced with particular cases [Hursthouse] |
4334 | Virtue ethics is open to the objection that it fails to show priority among the virtues [Hursthouse] |
4361 | Good animals can survive, breed, feel characteristic pleasure and pain, and contribute to the group [Hursthouse] |
4349 | Virtuous people may not be fully clear about their reasons for action [Hursthouse] |
4352 | Performing an act simply because it is virtuous is sufficient to be 'morally motivated' or 'dutiful' [Hursthouse] |
4353 | If moral motivation is an all-or-nothing sense of duty, how can children act morally? [Hursthouse] |
4346 | The emotions of sympathy, compassion and love are no guarantee of right action or acting well [Hursthouse] |
4339 | According to virtue ethics, two agents may respond differently, and yet both be right [Hursthouse] |
4354 | Maybe in a deeply poisoned character none of their milder character traits could ever be a virtue [Hursthouse] |
4364 | Being unusually virtuous in some areas may entail being less virtuous in others [Hursthouse] |
4356 | We are puzzled by a person who can show an exceptional virtue and also behave very badly [Hursthouse] |
4327 | Deontologists do consider consequences, because they reveal when a rule might apply [Hursthouse] |
4335 | 'Codifiable' morality give rules for decisions which don't require wisdom [Hursthouse] |
4328 | Preference utilitarianism aims to be completely value-free, or empirical [Hursthouse] |
4343 | We are torn between utilitarian and deontological views of lying, depending on the examples [Hursthouse] |
4338 | Deontologists usually accuse utilitarians of oversimplifying hard cases [Hursthouse] |
4365 | We are distinct from other animals in behaving rationally - pursuing something as good, for reasons [Hursthouse] |
4350 | If people are virtuous in obedience to God, would they become wicked if they lost their faith? [Hursthouse] |
16682 | Other things could occupy the same location as an angel [Suárez] |