Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Disputationes metaphysicae', 'Either/Or: a fragment of life' and 'Against Liberalism'

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63 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophy fails to articulate the continual becoming of existence [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
Traditional views of truth are tautologies, and truth is empty without a subject [Kierkegaard, by Scruton]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
There are entities, and then positive 'modes', modifying aspects outside the thing's essence [Suárez]
A mode determines the state and character of a quantity, without adding to it [Suárez]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Substances are incomplete unless they have modes [Suárez, by Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
Forms must rule over faculties and accidents, and are the source of action and unity [Suárez]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
Partial forms of leaf and fruit are united in the whole form of the tree [Suárez]
The best support for substantial forms is the co-ordinated unity of a natural being [Suárez]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object
We can get at the essential nature of 'quantity' by knowing bulk and extension [Suárez]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
We only know essences through non-essential features, esp. those closest to the essence [Suárez]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Identity does not exclude possible or imagined difference [Suárez, by Boulter]
Minor Real distinction: B needs A, but A doesn't need B [Suárez, by Boulter]
Major Real distinction: A and B have independent existences [Suárez, by Boulter]
Real Essential distinction: A and B are of different natural kinds [Suárez, by Boulter]
Conceptual/Mental distinction: one thing can be conceived of in two different ways [Suárez, by Boulter]
Modal distinction: A isn't B or its property, but still needs B [Suárez, by Boulter]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Scholastics assess possibility by what has actually happened in reality [Suárez, by Boulter]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Intuitions don't prove things; they just receptivity to interpretations [Kekes]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Liberals say we are only responsible for fully autonomous actions [Kekes]
Collective responsibility conflicts with responsibility's requirement of authonomy [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Much human evil is not autonomous, so moral responsibility need not be autonomous [Kekes]
Evil people may not be autonomously aware, if they misjudge the situation [Kekes]
Moral and causal responsibility are not clearly distinct [Kekes]
Effects show the existence of moral responsibility, and mental states show the degree [Kekes]
Why should moral responsibility depend on autonomy, rather than social role or experience? [Kekes]
Morality should aim to prevent all evil actions, not just autonomous ones [Kekes]
Ought implies can means moral responsibility needs autonomy [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Liberals assume people are naturally free, equal, rational, and morally good [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love should be partial, and discriminate in favour of its object [Kekes]
Sentimental love distorts its object [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
Evil is not deviation from the good, any more than good is a deviation from evil [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
What matters for morality is the effects of action, not the psychological causes [Kekes]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
It is said that if an agent is not autonomous then their evil actions don't reflect on their character [Kekes]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
Awareness of others' suffering doesn't create an obligation to help [Kekes]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
For me time stands still, and I with it [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
The plebeians bore others; only the nobility bore themselves [Kierkegaard]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 5. Existence-Essence
Reason is just abstractions, so our essence needs a subjective 'leap of faith' [Kierkegaard, by Scruton]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
There are aesthetic, ethical and religious subjectivity [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
What matters is not right choice, but energy, earnestness and pathos in the choosing [Kierkegaard]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / b. Veil of ignorance
The veil of ignorance is only needed because people have bad motivations [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The chief function of the state is to arbitrate between contending visions of the good life [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
Citizenship is easier than parenthood [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 1. Social Power
Power is meant to be confined to representatives, and subsequent delegation [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 3. Conservatism
Prosperity is a higher social virtue than justice [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
Liberal basics are pluralism, freedom, rights, equality, and distributive justice - for autonomy [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
The key liberal values are explained by the one core value, which is autonomy [Kekes]
Agents have little control over the capacities needed for liberal autonomy [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / c. Liberal equality
Liberals are egalitarians, but in varying degrees [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
Are egalitarians too coercive, or not egalitarian enough, or lax over morality? [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
Liberal distribution cares more about recipients than donors [Kekes]
Liberal justice ignores desert, which is the essence of justice [Kekes]
Why do liberals not see a much wider range of values as basic? [Kekes]
Liberals ignore contingency, and think people are good and equal, and institutions cause evil [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / b. Against communitarianism
Kierkegaard prioritises the inward individual, rather than community [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
To rectify the undeserved equality, we should give men longer and women shorter lives [Kekes]
It is just a fact that some people are morally better than others [Kekes]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
It is not deplorable that billionaires have more than millionaires [Kekes]
The problem is basic insufficiency of resources, not their inequality [Kekes]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
Justice combines consistency and desert; treat likes alike, judging likeness by desert [Kekes]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 3. Welfare provision
Liberal welfare focuses on need rather than desert [Kekes]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
Sexual morality doesn't require monogamy, but it needs a group of sensible regulations [Kekes]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / c. Angels
Other things could occupy the same location as an angel [Suárez]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
Faith is like a dancer's leap, going up to God, but also back to earth [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]