Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Disputationes metaphysicae', 'Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness'' and 'Causation'

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23 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
16665 There are entities, and then positive 'modes', modifying aspects outside the thing's essence [Suárez]
16666 A mode determines the state and character of a quantity, without adding to it [Suárez]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
16667 Substances are incomplete unless they have modes [Suárez, by Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
17007 Forms must rule over faculties and accidents, and are the source of action and unity [Suárez]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
16780 Partial forms of leaf and fruit are united in the whole form of the tree [Suárez]
16758 The best support for substantial forms is the co-ordinated unity of a natural being [Suárez]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object
16743 We can get at the essential nature of 'quantity' by knowing bulk and extension [Suárez]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
16742 We only know essences through non-essential features, esp. those closest to the essence [Suárez]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
22143 Identity does not exclude possible or imagined difference [Suárez, by Boulter]
22144 Real Essential distinction: A and B are of different natural kinds [Suárez, by Boulter]
22146 Minor Real distinction: B needs A, but A doesn't need B [Suárez, by Boulter]
22145 Major Real distinction: A and B have independent existences [Suárez, by Boulter]
22147 Conceptual/Mental distinction: one thing can be conceived of in two different ways [Suárez, by Boulter]
22148 Modal distinction: A isn't B or its property, but still needs B [Suárez, by Boulter]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
22149 Scholastics assess possibility by what has actually happened in reality [Suárez, by Boulter]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
8406 Not all explanations are causal, but if a thing can be explained at all, it can be explained causally [Sanford]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
9312 Consciousness is reductively explained either by how it represents, or how it is represented [Kriegel/Williford]
9313 Experiences can be represented consciously or unconsciously, so representation won't explain consciousness [Kriegel/Williford]
9315 Red tomato experiences are conscious if the state represents the tomato and itself [Kriegel/Williford]
9316 How is self-representation possible, does it produce a regress, and is experience like that? [Kriegel/Williford]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
9314 Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error [Kriegel/Williford]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
8407 A totality of conditions necessary for an occurrence is usually held to be jointly sufficient for it [Sanford]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / c. Angels
16682 Other things could occupy the same location as an angel [Suárez]