29 ideas
17275 | Realist metaphysics concerns what is real; naive metaphysics concerns natures of things [Fine,K] |
17282 | Truths need not always have their source in what exists [Fine,K] |
17283 | If the truth-making relation is modal, then modal truths will be grounded in anything [Fine,K] |
17286 | Logical consequence is verification by a possible world within a truth-set [Fine,K] |
17272 | 2+2=4 is necessary if it is snowing, but not true in virtue of the fact that it is snowing [Fine,K] |
17276 | If you say one thing causes another, that leaves open that the 'other' has its own distinct reality [Fine,K] |
17284 | An immediate ground is the next lower level, which gives the concept of a hierarchy [Fine,K] |
17285 | 'Strict' ground moves down the explanations, but 'weak' ground can move sideways [Fine,K] |
17288 | We learn grounding from what is grounded, not what does the grounding [Fine,K] |
17281 | If grounding is a relation it must be between entities of the same type, preferably between facts [Fine,K] |
17280 | Ground is best understood as a sentence operator, rather than a relation between predicates [Fine,K] |
17290 | Only metaphysical grounding must be explained by essence [Fine,K] |
17274 | Philosophical explanation is largely by ground (just as cause is used in science) [Fine,K] |
17278 | We can only explain how a reduction is possible if we accept the concept of ground [Fine,K] |
17287 | Facts, such as redness and roundness of a ball, can be 'fused' into one fact [Fine,K] |
17279 | Even a three-dimensionalist might identify temporal parts, in their thinking [Fine,K] |
17273 | Each basic modality has its 'own' explanatory relation [Fine,K] |
17289 | Every necessary truth is grounded in the nature of something [Fine,K] |
17291 | We explain by identity (what it is), or by truth (how things are) [Fine,K] |
17271 | Is there metaphysical explanation (as well as causal), involving a constitutive form of determination? [Fine,K] |
17277 | If mind supervenes on the physical, it may also explain the physical (and not vice versa) [Fine,K] |
6237 | Fear of God is not conscience, which is a natural feeling of offence at bad behaviour [Shaftesbury] |
6234 | If an irrational creature with kind feelings was suddenly given reason, its reason would approve of kind feelings [Shaftesbury] |
16764 | The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus] |
6233 | A person isn't good if only tying their hands prevents their mischief, so the affections decide a person's morality [Shaftesbury] |
6236 | People more obviously enjoy social pleasures than they do eating and drinking [Shaftesbury] |
6235 | Self-interest is not intrinsically good, but its absence is evil, as public good needs it [Shaftesbury] |
6232 | Every creature has a right and a wrong state which guide its actions, so there must be a natural end [Shaftesbury] |
5642 | For Shaftesbury, we must already have a conscience to be motivated to religious obedience [Shaftesbury, by Scruton] |