Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Commentary on 'De Anima'', 'Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit' and 'The Justification of Deduction'

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19 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
19066 Philosophy aims to understand the world, through ordinary experience and science [Dummett]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 6. Conclusive Proof
19067 A successful proof requires recognition of truth at every step [Dummett]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 3. Truth Tables
19060 Truth-tables are dubious in some cases, and may be a bad way to explain connective meaning [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
11066 Deduction is justified by the semantics of its metalanguage [Dummett, by Hanna]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
19058 Syntactic consequence is positive, for validity; semantic version is negative, with counterexamples [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
19063 Beth trees show semantics for intuitionistic logic, in terms of how truth has been established [Dummett]
19059 In standard views you could replace 'true' and 'false' with mere 0 and 1 [Dummett]
19062 Classical two-valued semantics implies that meaning is grasped through truth-conditions [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
19065 Soundness and completeness proofs test the theory of meaning, rather than the logic theory [Dummett]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
19061 An explanation is often a deduction, but that may well beg the question [Dummett]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
19064 Holism is not a theory of meaning; it is the denial that a theory of meaning is possible [Dummett]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
6237 Fear of God is not conscience, which is a natural feeling of offence at bad behaviour [Shaftesbury]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
6234 If an irrational creature with kind feelings was suddenly given reason, its reason would approve of kind feelings [Shaftesbury]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
16764 The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
6233 A person isn't good if only tying their hands prevents their mischief, so the affections decide a person's morality [Shaftesbury]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
6236 People more obviously enjoy social pleasures than they do eating and drinking [Shaftesbury]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
6235 Self-interest is not intrinsically good, but its absence is evil, as public good needs it [Shaftesbury]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
6232 Every creature has a right and a wrong state which guide its actions, so there must be a natural end [Shaftesbury]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
5642 For Shaftesbury, we must already have a conscience to be motivated to religious obedience [Shaftesbury, by Scruton]