13 ideas
8797 | The negation of all my beliefs about my current headache would be fully coherent [Sosa] |
7301 | The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7302 | Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7303 | If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7299 | Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7300 | An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
8794 | There are very few really obvious truths, and not much can be proved from them [Sosa] |
8796 | A single belief can trail two regresses, one terminating and one not [Sosa] |
8799 | If mental states are not propositional, they are logically dumb, and cannot be foundations [Sosa] |
8795 | Mental states cannot be foundational if they are not immune to error [Sosa] |
7297 | My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
8798 | Vision causes and justifies beliefs; but to some extent the cause is the justification [Sosa] |
16764 | The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus] |