78 ideas
| 19250 | Everything interesting should be recorded, with records that can be rearranged [Peirce] |
| 19228 | Sciences concern existence, but philosophy also concerns potential existence [Peirce] |
| 19241 | An idea on its own isn't an idea, because they are continuous systems [Peirce] |
| 19227 | Philosophy is a search for real truth [Peirce] |
| 19218 | Metaphysics is pointless without exact modern logic [Peirce] |
| 19229 | Metaphysics is the science of both experience, and its general laws and types [Peirce] |
| 19219 | Metaphysical reasoning is simple enough, but the concepts are very hard [Peirce] |
| 1887 | You cannot divide anything into many parts, because after the first division you are no longer dividing the original [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 19231 | Metaphysics is turning into logic, and logic is becoming mathematics [Peirce] |
| 1885 | Proof moves from agreed premises to a non-evident inference [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 19247 | The one unpardonable offence in reasoning is to block the route to further truth [Peirce] |
| 19246 | 'Holding for true' is either practical commitment, or provisional theory [Peirce] |
| 19237 | Deduction is true when the premises facts necessarily make the conclusion fact true [Peirce] |
| 12196 | A valid hypothetical syllogism is 'that which does not begin with a truth and end with a falsehood' [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 19256 | Our research always hopes that reality embodies the logic we are employing [Peirce] |
| 19238 | The logic of relatives relies on objects built of any relations (rather than on classes) [Peirce] |
| 1902 | Since Socrates either died when he was alive (a contradiction) or died when he was dead (meaningless), he didn't die [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 19226 | We now know that mathematics only studies hypotheses, not facts [Peirce] |
| 19240 | Realism is the belief that there is something in the being of things corresponding to our reasoning [Peirce] |
| 19239 | There may be no reality; it's just our one desperate hope of knowing anything [Peirce] |
| 19252 | Objective chance is the property of a distribution [Peirce] |
| 19232 | In ordinary language a conditional statement assumes that the antecedent is true [Peirce] |
| 19223 | We act on 'full belief' in a crisis, but 'opinion' only operates for trivial actions [Peirce] |
| 1889 | If an argument has an absurd conclusion, we should not assent to the absurdity, but avoid the absurd argument [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1871 | Whether honey is essentially sweet may be doubted, as it is a matter of judgement rather than appearance [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1883 | How can the intellect know if sensation is reliable if it doesn't directly see external objects? [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 19253 | We talk of 'association by resemblance' but that is wrong: the association constitutes the resemblance [Peirce] |
| 1890 | We distinguish ambiguities by seeing what is useful [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 19224 | Scientists will give up any conclusion, if experience opposes it [Peirce] |
| 1870 | The basis of scepticism is the claim that every proposition has an equal opposing proposition [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1882 | The necks of doves appear different in colour depending on the angle of viewing [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1881 | The same oar seems bent in water and straight when out of it [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1872 | The same tower appears round from a distance, but square close at hand [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1873 | If we press the side of an eyeball, objects appear a different shape [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1874 | How can we judge between our impressions and those of other animals, when we ourselves are involved? [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1878 | Water that seems lukewarm can seem very hot on inflamed skin [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1880 | Some actions seem shameful when sober but not when drunk [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1877 | If we had no hearing or sight, we would assume no sound or sight exists, so there may be unsensed qualities [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1879 | Sickness is perfectly natural to the sick, so their natural perceptions should carry some weight [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1876 | If we enjoy different things, presumably we receive different impressions [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1911 | Even if all known nations agree on a practice, there may be unknown nations which disagree [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1910 | With us it is shameful for men to wear earrings, but among Syrians it is considered noble [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 19243 | If each inference slightly reduced our certainty, science would soon be in trouble [Peirce] |
| 19225 | I classify science by level of abstraction; principles derive from above, and data from below [Peirce] |
| 19234 | 'Induction' doesn't capture Greek 'epagoge', which is singulars in a mass producing the general [Peirce] |
| 19235 | How does induction get started? [Peirce] |
| 19236 | Induction can never prove that laws have no exceptions [Peirce] |
| 19251 | The worst fallacy in induction is generalising one recondite property from a sample [Peirce] |
| 1886 | If you don't view every particular, you may miss the one which disproves your universal induction [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 19222 | Men often answer inner 'whys' by treating unconscious instincts as if they were reasons [Peirce] |
| 19220 | We may think animals reason very little, but they hardly ever make mistakes! [Peirce] |
| 19255 | Generalisation is the great law of mind [Peirce] |
| 19242 | Generalization is the true end of life [Peirce] |
| 19249 | 'Know yourself' is not introspection; it is grasping how others see you [Peirce] |
| 19257 | Whatever is First must be sentient [Peirce] |
| 19248 | Reasoning involves observation, experiment, and habituation [Peirce] |
| 19221 | Everybody overrates their own reasoning, so it is clearly superficial [Peirce] |
| 1884 | If we utter three steps of a logical argument, they never exist together [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 19233 | Indexicals are unusual words, because they stimulate the hearer to look around [Peirce] |
| 16764 | The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus] |
| 19230 | People should follow what lies before them, and is within their power [Peirce] |
| 19245 | We are not inspired by other people's knowledge; a sense of our ignorance motivates study [Peirce] |
| 19244 | Chemists rely on a single experiment to establish a fact; repetition is pointless [Peirce] |
| 1894 | Some say that causes are physical, some say not [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1897 | Knowing an effect results from a cause means knowing that the cause belongs with the effect, which is circular [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1898 | Cause can't exist before effect, or exist at the same time, so it doesn't exist [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1896 | If there were no causes then everything would have been randomly produced by everything [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1895 | Causes are either equal to the effect, or they link equally with other causes, or they contribute slightly [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 19254 | Our laws of nature may be the result of evolution [Peirce] |
| 1901 | If all atoms, times and places are the same, everything should move with equal velocity [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1900 | If time and place are infinitely divided, it becomes impossible for movement ever to begin [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1899 | Does the original self-mover push itself from behind, or pull itself from in front? [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1903 | If motion and rest are abolished, so is time [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1904 | Time must be unlimited, but past and present can't be non-existent, and can't be now, so time does not exist [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1905 | How can time be divisible if we can't compare one length of time with another? [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1891 | How can we agree on the concept of God, unless we agree on his substance or form or place? [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1892 | The existence of God can't be self-evident or everyone would have agreed on it, so it needs demonstration [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 1893 | If God foresaw evil he would presumably prevent it, and if he only foresees some things, why those things? [Sext.Empiricus] |