39 ideas
22216 | Phenomenology studies different types of correlation between consciousness and its objects [Husserl, by Bernet] |
21217 | Phenomenology needs absolute reflection, without presuppositions [Husserl] |
22218 | There can only be a science of fluctuating consciousness if it focuses on stable essences [Husserl, by Bernet] |
22217 | Phenomenology aims to validate objects, on the basis of intentional intuitive experience [Husserl, by Bernet] |
22219 | Husserl saw transcendental phenomenology as idealist, in its construction of objects [Husserl, by Bernet] |
22204 | Start philosophising with no preconceptions, from the intuitively non-theoretical self-given [Husserl] |
22207 | Epoché or 'bracketing' is refraining from judgement, even when some truths are certain [Husserl] |
22208 | 'Bracketing' means no judgements at all about spatio-temporal existence [Husserl] |
22210 | After everything is bracketed, consciousness still has a unique being of its own [Husserl] |
22215 | Phenomenology describes consciousness, in the light of pure experiences [Husserl] |
22201 | The use of mathematical-style definitions in philosophy is fruitless and harmful [Husserl] |
6334 | The function of the truth predicate? Understanding 'true'? Meaning of 'true'? The concept of truth? A theory of truth? [Horwich] |
6342 | Some correspondence theories concern facts; others are built up through reference and satisfaction [Horwich] |
6332 | The common-sense theory of correspondence has never been worked out satisfactorily [Horwich] |
6335 | The redundancy theory cannot explain inferences from 'what x said is true' and 'x said p', to p [Horwich] |
6344 | Truth is a useful concept for unarticulated propositions and generalisations about them [Horwich] |
6336 | No deflationary conception of truth does justice to the fact that we aim for truth [Horwich] |
23299 | Horwich's deflationary view is novel, because it relies on propositions rather than sentences [Horwich, by Davidson] |
6337 | The deflationary picture says believing a theory true is a trivial step after believing the theory [Horwich] |
6339 | Logical form is the aspects of meaning that determine logical entailments [Horwich] |
22209 | Our goal is to reveal a new hidden region of Being [Husserl] |
22211 | As a thing and its perception are separated, two modes of Being emerge [Husserl] |
22202 | The World is all experiencable objects [Husserl] |
22213 | Absolute reality is an absurdity [Husserl] |
21218 | The sense of anything contingent has a purely apprehensible essence or Eidos [Husserl] |
19263 | Imagine an object's properties varying; the ones that won't vary are the essential ones [Husserl, by Vaidya] |
21220 | The physical given, unlike the mental given, could be non-existing [Husserl] |
22205 | Feelings of self-evidence (and necessity) are just the inventions of theory [Husserl] |
21221 | Direct 'seeing' by consciousness is the ultimate rational legitimation [Husserl] |
22220 | The phenomena of memory are given in the present, but as being past [Husserl, by Bernet] |
22206 | Natural science has become great by just ignoring ancient scepticism [Husserl] |
22221 | We know another's mind via bodily expression, while also knowing it is inaccessible [Husserl, by Bernet] |
22212 | Pure consciousness is a sealed off system of actual Being [Husserl] |
22214 | We never meet the Ego, as part of experience, or as left over from experience [Husserl] |
6338 | We could know the truth-conditions of a foreign sentence without knowing its meaning [Horwich] |
6340 | There are Fregean de dicto propositions, and Russellian de re propositions, or a mixture [Horwich] |
6341 | Right translation is a mapping of languages which preserves basic patterns of usage [Horwich] |
22203 | Only facts follow from facts [Husserl] |
16764 | The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus] |