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All the ideas for 'Commentary on 'De Anima'', 'Discourse on the Origin of Inequality' and 'works'

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102 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / b. Seventeenth century philosophy
Leibniz aims to give coherent rational support for empiricism [Leibniz, by Perkins]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is a science of the intelligible nature of being [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Leibniz tried to combine mechanistic physics with scholastic metaphysics [Leibniz, by Pasnau]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Reason is the faculty for grasping apriori necessary truths [Leibniz, by Burge]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
For Leibniz rationality is based on non-contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason [Leibniz, by Benardete,JA]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Reason leads to prudent selfishness, which overrules natural compassion [Rousseau]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Leibniz said the principle of sufficient reason is synthetic a priori, since its denial is not illogical [Leibniz, by Benardete,JA]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 6. Conclusive Proof
Leibniz is inclined to regard all truths as provable [Leibniz, by Frege]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
Number cannot be defined as addition of ones, since that needs the number; it is a single act of abstraction [Fine,K on Leibniz]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / j. Infinite divisibility
The continuum is not divided like sand, but folded like paper [Leibniz, by Arthur,R]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / k. Infinitesimals
A tangent is a line connecting two points on a curve that are infinitely close together [Leibniz]
Nature uses the infinite everywhere [Leibniz]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
Leibniz proposes monads, since there must be basic things, which are immaterial in order to have unity [Leibniz, by Jolley]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
If relations can be reduced to, or supervene on, monadic properties of relata, they are not real [Leibniz, by Swoyer]
Relations aren't in any monad, so they are distributed, so they are not real [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
Forms have sensation and appetite, the latter being the ability to act on other bodies [Leibniz, by Garber]
The essence of a thing is its real possibilities [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Leibniz moved from individuation by whole entity to individuation by substantial form [Leibniz, by Garber]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
The laws-of-the-series plays a haecceitist role [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Identity of a substance is the law of its persistence [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
Leibniz bases pure primitive entities on conjunctions of qualitative properties [Leibniz, by Adams,RM]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Leibnizian substances add concept, law, force, form and soul [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
Substances are essentially active [Leibniz, by Jolley]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / c. Form as causal
Leibniz strengthened hylomorphism by connecting it to force in physics [Leibniz, by Garber]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Leibniz's view (that all properties are essential) is extreme essentialism, not its denial [Leibniz, by Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Leibniz was not an essentialist [Leibniz, by Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
Two eggs can't be identical, because the same truths can't apply to both of them [Leibniz]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
Things are the same if one can be substituted for the other without loss of truth [Leibniz]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Necessary truths are those provable from identities by pure logic in finite steps [Leibniz, by Hacking]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
How can things be incompatible, if all positive terms seem to be compatible? [Leibniz]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
A reason must be given why contingent beings should exist rather than not exist [Leibniz]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Leibniz narrows down God's options to one, by non-contradiction, sufficient reason, indiscernibles, compossibility [Leibniz, by Harré]
Each monad expresses all its compatible monads; a possible world is the resulting equivalence class [Leibniz, by Rumfitt]
Leibniz proposed possible worlds, because they might be evil, where God would not create evil things [Leibniz, by Stewart,M]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Leibniz has a counterpart view of de re counterfactuals [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
No one would bother to reason, and try to know things, without a desire for enjoyment [Rousseau]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
For Leibniz, divine understanding grasps every conceivable possibility [Leibniz, by Perkins]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
Leibniz said dualism of mind and body is illusion, and there is only mind [Leibniz, by Martin/Barresi]
Leibniz is an idealist insofar as the basic components of his universe are all mental [Leibniz, by Jolley]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
The essence of substance is the law of its changes, as in the series of numbers [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
Leibniz introduced the idea of degrees of consciousness, essential for his monads [Leibniz, by Perkins]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
General ideas are purely intellectual; imagining them is immediately particular [Rousseau]
Only words can introduce general ideas into the mind [Rousseau]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
We think we are free because the causes of the will are unknown; determinism is a false problem [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
Leibniz has a panpsychist view that physical points are spiritual [Leibniz, by Martin/Barresi]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 4. Occasionalism
Occasionalism give a false view of natural laws, miracles, and substances [Leibniz, by Jolley]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
Concepts are ordered, and show eternal possibilities, deriving from God [Leibniz, by Arthur,R]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / a. Concepts and language
Language may aid thinking, but powerful thought was needed to produce language [Rousseau]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
Leibniz was the first modern to focus on sentence-sized units (where empiricists preferred word-size) [Leibniz, by Hart,WD]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Limited awareness leads to bad choices, and unconscious awareness makes us choose the bad [Leibniz, by Perkins]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Leibniz identified beauty with intellectual perfection [Leibniz, by Gardner]
Without love, what use is beauty? [Rousseau]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Humans are moral, and capable of reward and punishment, because of memory and self-consciousness [Leibniz, by Jolley]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Rational morality is OK for brainy people, but ordinary life can't rely on that [Rousseau]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / h. Good as benefit
If we should not mistreat humans, it is mainly because of sentience, not rationality [Rousseau]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
The better Golden Rule is 'do good for yourself without harming others' [Rousseau]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
The fact that we weep (e.g. in theatres) shows that we are naturally compassionate [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Humans are less distinguished from other animals by understanding, than by being free agents [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
Most human ills are self-inflicted; the simple, solitary, regular natural life is good [Rousseau]
Is language a pre-requisite for society, or might it emerge afterwards? [Rousseau]
I doubt whether a savage person ever complains of life, or considers suicide [Rousseau]
Leisure led to envy, inequality, vice and revenge, which we now see in savages [Rousseau]
Primitive man was very gentle [Rousseau]
Our two starting principles are concern for self-interest, and compassion for others [Rousseau]
Savages avoid evil because they are calm, and never think of it (not because they know goodness) [Rousseau]
Savage men quietly pursue desires, without the havoc of modern frenzied imagination [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / a. Natural freedom
A savage can steal fruit or a home, but there is no means of achieving obedience [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / b. Natural equality
In a state of nature people are much more equal; it is society which increases inequalities [Rousseau]
It is against nature for children to rule old men, fools to rule the wise, and the rich to hog resources [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / a. Sovereignty
People accept the right to be commanded, because they themselves wish to command [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
We seem to have made individual progress since savagery, but actually the species has decayed [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
Revolutionaries usually confuse liberty with total freedom, and end up with heavier chains [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
Plebiscites are bad, because they exclude the leaders from crucial decisions [Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / c. Direct democracy
In a direct democracy, only the leaders should be able to propose new laws [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
Enslaved peoples often boast of their condition, calling it a state of 'peace' [Rousseau]
If the child of a slave woman is born a slave, then a man is not born a man [Rousseau]
People must be made dependent before they can be enslaved [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Like rich food, liberty can ruin people who are too weak to cope with it [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Three stages of the state produce inequalities of wealth, power, and enslavement [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
The pleasure of wealth and power is largely seeing others deprived of them [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
Persuading other people that some land was 'owned' was the beginning of society [Rousseau]
What else could property arise from, but the labour people add to it? [Rousseau]
Land cultivation led to a general right of ownership, administered justly [Rousseau]
If we have a natural right to property, what exactly does 'belonging to' mean? [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Natural law theory is found in Aquinas, in Leibniz, and at the Nuremberg trials [Leibniz, by Jolley]
Writers just propose natural law as the likely useful agreements among people [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Primitive people simply redressed the evil caused by violence, without thought of punishing [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / e. Peace
A state of war remains after a conquest, if the losers don't accept the winners [Rousseau]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Both men and animals are sentient, which should give the latter the right not to be mistreated [Rousseau]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
Leibniz rejected atoms, because they must be elastic, and hence have parts [Leibniz, by Garber]
Microscopes and the continuum suggest that matter is endlessly divisible [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / a. Early Modern matter
Leibniz struggled to reconcile bodies with a reality of purely soul-like entities [Jolley on Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / c. Matter as extension
Leibniz eventually said resistance, rather than extension, was the essence of body [Leibniz, by Pasnau]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
Men started with too few particular names, but later had too few natural kind names [Rousseau]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Leibniz wanted to explain motion and its laws by the nature of body [Leibniz, by Garber]
The law within something fixes its persistence, and accords with general laws of nature [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 10. Closure of Physics
Leibniz had an unusual commitment to the causal completeness of physics [Leibniz, by Papineau]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
Leibniz uses 'force' to mean both activity and potential [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Small uninterrupted causes can have big effects [Rousseau]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
God's existence is either necessary or impossible [Leibniz, by Scruton]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Leibniz was closer than Spinoza to atheism [Leibniz, by Stewart,M]