9 ideas
12270 | Being is one [Melissus, by Aristotle] |
5504 | Maybe we should see persons in four dimensions, with stages or time-slices at an instant [Martin/Barresi] |
5503 | Maybe personal identity is not vital in survival, and other continuations would suffice [Martin/Barresi] |
5502 | Locke's intrinsic view of personal identity has been replaced by an externalist view [Martin/Barresi] |
16764 | The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus] |
3059 | There is no real motion, only the appearance of it [Melissus, by Diog. Laertius] |
5100 | The void is not required for change, because a plenum can alter in quality [Aristotle on Melissus] |
456 | Nothing could come out of nothing [Melissus] |
5505 | For Aristotle the psyche perishes with the body (except possibly 'nous') [Martin/Barresi] |