20 ideas
| 23449 | Interpreting a text is representing it as making sense [Morris,M] |
| 3993 | Arguments are nearly always open to challenge, but they help to explain a position rather than force people to believe [Lewis] |
| 23484 | Bipolarity adds to Bivalence the capacity for both truth values [Morris,M] |
| 23494 | Conjunctive and disjunctive quantifiers are too specific, and are confined to the finite [Morris,M] |
| 23451 | Counting needs to distinguish things, and also needs the concept of a successor in a series [Morris,M] |
| 23460 | To count, we must distinguish things, and have a series with successors in it [Morris,M] |
| 23452 | Discriminating things for counting implies concepts of identity and distinctness [Morris,M] |
| 3990 | The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth [Lewis] |
| 3991 | Where pixels make up a picture, supervenience is reduction [Lewis] |
| 3995 | A mind is an organ of representation [Lewis] |
| 3994 | Human pain might be one thing; Martian pain might be something else [Lewis] |
| 3989 | I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything [Lewis] |
| 3992 | Folk psychology makes good predictions, by associating mental states with causal roles [Lewis] |
| 3996 | Folk psychology doesn't say that there is a language of thought [Lewis] |
| 3998 | If you don't share an external world with a brain-in-a-vat, then externalism says you don't share any beliefs [Lewis] |
| 3997 | Nothing shows that all content is 'wide', or that wide content has logical priority [Lewis] |
| 3999 | A spontaneous duplicate of you would have your brain states but no experience, so externalism would deny him any beliefs [Lewis] |
| 4000 | Wide content derives from narrow content and relationships with external things [Lewis] |
| 23491 | There must exist a general form of propositions, which are predictabe. It is: such and such is the case [Morris,M] |
| 16764 | The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus] |