14 ideas
9175 | We may fix the reference of 'Cicero' by a description, but thereafter the name is rigid [Kripke] |
9171 | The function of names is simply to refer [Kripke] |
9174 | It is necessary that this table is not made of ice, but we don't know it a priori [Kripke] |
9172 | A 'rigid designator' designates the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke] |
9173 | We cannot say that Nixon might have been a different man from the one he actually was [Kripke] |
9176 | Modal statements about this table never refer to counterparts; that confuses epistemology and metaphysics [Kripke] |
9177 | Identity theorists must deny that pains can be imagined without brain states [Kripke] |
9178 | Pain, unlike heat, is picked out by an essential property [Kripke] |
22392 | Morality is inescapable, in descriptive words such as 'dishonest', 'unjust' and 'uncharitable' [Foot] |
23685 | Reason is not a motivator of morality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
23691 | Rejecting moral rules may be villainous, but it isn't inconsistent [Foot] |
16764 | The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus] |
22391 | Saying we 'ought to be moral' makes no sense, unless it relates to some other system [Foot] |
22389 | Morality no more consists of categorical imperatives than etiquette does [Foot] |