Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Commentary on 'De Anima'', 'The Sophist' and 'Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula'

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29 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
We must fight fiercely for knowledge, understanding and intelligence [Plato]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
The desire to split everything into its parts is unpleasant and unphilosophical [Plato]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Good analysis involves dividing things into appropriate forms without confusion [Plato]
Dialectic should only be taught to those who already philosophise well [Plato]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 2. Elenchus
In discussion a person's opinions are shown to be in conflict, leading to calm self-criticism [Plato]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
The truthmaker principle requires some specific named thing to make the difference [Williamson]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
Truthmaker is incompatible with modal semantics of varying domains [Williamson]
The converse Barcan formula will not allow contingent truths to have truthmakers [Williamson]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
If metaphysical possibility is not a contingent matter, then S5 seems to suit it best [Williamson]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
If the domain of propositional quantification is constant, the Barcan formulas hold [Williamson]
Converse Barcan: could something fail to meet a condition, if everything meets that condition? [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Not all quantification is either objectual or substitutional [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
Substitutional quantification is metaphysical neutral, and equivalent to a disjunction of instances [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
Not all quantification is objectual or substitutional [Williamson]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
What does 'that which is not' refer to? [Plato]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
If statements about non-existence are logically puzzling, so are statements about existence [Plato]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
To be is to have a capacity, to act on other things, or to receive actions [Plato]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Some alarming thinkers think that only things which you can touch exist [Plato]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
If 'fact' is a noun, can we name the fact that dogs bark 'Mary'? [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
Whenever there's speech it has to be about something [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Good thinkers spot forms spread through things, or included within some larger form [Plato]
The not-beautiful is part of the beautiful, though opposed to it, and is just as real [Plato]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
If we see everything as separate, we can then give no account of it [Plato]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
Our ability to count objects across possibilities favours the Barcan formulas [Williamson]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
A soul without understanding is ugly [Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Wickedness is an illness of the soul [Plato]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Didactic education is hard work and achieves little [Plato]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
A thing can't be the only necessary existent, because its singleton set would be as well [Williamson]