17 ideas
| 22138 | Science rests on scholastic metaphysics, not on Hume, Kant or Carnap [Boulter] |
| 3509 | Externalism may be the key idea in philosophical naturalism [Papineau] |
| 22134 | Thoughts are general, but the world isn't, so how can we think accurately? [Boulter] |
| 22150 | Logical possibility needs the concepts of the proposition to be adequate [Boulter] |
| 22139 | Experiments don't just observe; they look to see what interventions change the natural order [Boulter] |
| 22136 | Science begins with sufficient reason, de-animation, and the importance of nature [Boulter] |
| 22135 | Our concepts can never fully capture reality, but simplification does not falsify [Boulter] |
| 3513 | How does a dualist mind represent, exist outside space, and be transparent to itself? [Papineau] |
| 3514 | Functionalism needs causation and intentionality to explain actions [Papineau] |
| 3510 | Epiphenomenalism is supervenience without physicalism [Papineau] |
| 3511 | Supervenience requires all mental events to have physical effects [Papineau] |
| 3515 | Knowing what it is like to be something only involves being (physically) that thing [Papineau] |
| 3512 | If a mental state is multiply realisable, why does it lead to similar behaviour? [Papineau] |
| 22152 | Aristotelians accept the analytic-synthetic distinction [Boulter] |
| 3516 | The Private Language argument only means people may misjudge their experiences [Papineau] |
| 22156 | The facts about human health are the measure of the values in our lives [Boulter] |
| 16764 | The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus] |