16 ideas
| 17990 | Instances of minimal truth miss out propositions inexpressible in current English [Hofweber] |
| 17988 | Quantification can't all be substitutional; some reference is obviously to objects [Hofweber] |
| 17989 | Since properties have properties, there can be a typed or a type-free theory of them [Hofweber] |
| 19527 | We don't acquire evidence and then derive some knowledge, because evidence IS knowledge [Williamson] |
| 19528 | Knowledge is prior to believing, just as doing is prior to trying to do [Williamson] |
| 19529 | Belief explains justification, and knowledge explains belief, so knowledge explains justification [Williamson] |
| 19530 | A neutral state of experience, between error and knowledge, is not basic; the successful state is basic [Williamson] |
| 19531 | Internalism about mind is an obsolete view, and knowledge-first epistemology develops externalism [Williamson] |
| 19536 | Knowledge-first says your total evidence IS your knowledge [Williamson] |
| 19526 | Surely I am acquainted with physical objects, not with appearances? [Williamson] |
| 19534 | How does inferentialism distinguish the patterns of inference that are essential to meaning? [Williamson] |
| 19535 | Internalist inferentialism has trouble explaining how meaning and reference relate [Williamson] |
| 19533 | Inferentialist semantics relies on internal inference relations, not on external references [Williamson] |
| 19532 | Truth-conditional referential semantics is externalist, referring to worldly items [Williamson] |
| 17991 | Holism says language can't be translated; the expressibility hypothesis says everything can [Hofweber] |
| 16764 | The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus] |