20 ideas
| 22138 | Science rests on scholastic metaphysics, not on Hume, Kant or Carnap [Boulter] |
| 17954 | Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter] |
| 22134 | Thoughts are general, but the world isn't, so how can we think accurately? [Boulter] |
| 17953 | Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter] |
| 17952 | Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter] |
| 14633 | How do we tell a table's being contingently plastic from its being essentially plastic? [Jackson] |
| 14635 | An x is essentially F if it is F in every possible world in which it appears [Jackson] |
| 14632 | Quine may have conflated de re and de dicto essentialism, but there is a real epistemological problem [Jackson] |
| 17959 | Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter] |
| 22150 | Logical possibility needs the concepts of the proposition to be adequate [Boulter] |
| 17955 | Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter] |
| 17957 | Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter] |
| 14631 | How can you show the necessity of an a posteriori necessity, if it might turn out to be false? [Jackson] |
| 17958 | The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter] |
| 17956 | Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter] |
| 22139 | Experiments don't just observe; they look to see what interventions change the natural order [Boulter] |
| 22136 | Science begins with sufficient reason, de-animation, and the importance of nature [Boulter] |
| 22135 | Our concepts can never fully capture reality, but simplification does not falsify [Boulter] |
| 22152 | Aristotelians accept the analytic-synthetic distinction [Boulter] |
| 22156 | The facts about human health are the measure of the values in our lives [Boulter] |