16 ideas
18696 | The vagueness of truthmaker claims makes it easier to run anti-realist arguments [Button] |
18701 | The coherence theory says truth is coherence of thoughts, and not about objects [Button] |
19086 | Does the pragmatic theory of meaning support objective truth, or make it impossible? [Macbeth] |
18694 | Permutation Theorem: any theory with a decent model has lots of models [Button] |
19093 | Greek mathematics is wholly sensory, where ours is wholly inferential [Macbeth] |
18692 | Realists believe in independent objects, correspondence, and fallibility of all theories [Button] |
18693 | Indeterminacy arguments say if a theory can be made true, it has multiple versions [Button] |
18695 | An ideal theory can't be wholly false, because its consistency implies a true model [Button] |
18700 | Cartesian scepticism doubts what is true; Kantian scepticism doubts that it is sayable [Button] |
18698 | Predictions give the 'content' of theories, which can then be 'equivalent' or 'adequate' [Button] |
19091 | Seeing reality mathematically makes it an object of thought, not of experience [Macbeth] |
7880 | If a blind persons suddenly sees a kestrel, that doesn't make visual and theoretical kestrels different [Papineau on Jackson] |
7378 | No one bothers to imagine what it would really be like to have ALL the physical information [Dennett on Jackson] |
7377 | Mary learns when she sees colour, so her complete physical information had missed something [Jackson] |
19088 | For pragmatists a concept means its consequences [Macbeth] |
18697 | A sentence's truth conditions are all the situations where it would be true [Button] |