17 ideas
| 9766 | Study vagueness first by its logic, then by its truth-conditions, and then its metaphysics [Fine,K] |
| 9775 | Excluded Middle, and classical logic, may fail for vague predicates [Fine,K] |
| 9771 | Logic holding between indefinite sentences is the core of all language [Fine,K] |
| 17809 | Gödel showed that the syntactic approach to the infinite is of limited value [Kreisel] |
| 17810 | The study of mathematical foundations needs new non-mathematical concepts [Kreisel] |
| 9768 | Vagueness is semantic, a deficiency of meaning [Fine,K] |
| 9776 | A thing might be vaguely vague, giving us higher-order vagueness [Fine,K] |
| 9767 | A vague sentence is only true for all ways of making it completely precise [Fine,K] |
| 9770 | Logical connectives cease to be truth-functional if vagueness is treated with three values [Fine,K] |
| 9772 | Meaning is both actual (determining instances) and potential (possibility of greater precision) [Fine,K] |
| 9773 | With the super-truth approach, the classical connectives continue to work [Fine,K] |
| 9774 | Borderline cases must be under our control, as capable of greater precision [Fine,K] |
| 9769 | Vagueness can be in predicates, names or quantifiers [Fine,K] |
| 7880 | If a blind persons suddenly sees a kestrel, that doesn't make visual and theoretical kestrels different [Papineau on Jackson] |
| 7378 | No one bothers to imagine what it would really be like to have ALL the physical information [Dennett on Jackson] |
| 7377 | Mary learns when she sees colour, so her complete physical information had missed something [Jackson] |
| 17811 | The natural conception of points ducks the problem of naming or constructing each point [Kreisel] |