Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On Assertion and Indicative Conditionals', 'Critique of Judgement I: Aesthetic' and 'Consistency and realism (with 1972 note)'

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16 ideas

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
'If A,B' affirms that A⊃B, and also that this wouldn't change if A were certain [Jackson, by Edgington]
Conditionals are truth-functional, but should only be asserted when they are confident [Jackson, by Edgington]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
Kant gave form and status to aesthetics, and Hegel gave it content [Kant, by Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
The aesthetic attitude is a matter of disinterestedness [Kant, by Wollheim]
Only rational beings can experience beauty [Kant, by Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
With respect to the senses, taste is an entirely personal matter [Kant]
When we judge beauty, it isn't just personal; we judge on behalf of everybody [Kant]
Saying everyone has their own taste destroys the very idea of taste [Kant]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
The beautiful is not conceptualised as moral, but it symbolises or resembles goodness [Kant, by Murdoch]
Kant saw beauty as a sort of disinterested pleasure, which has become separate from the good [Kant, by Taylor,C]
Beauty is only judged in pure contemplation, and not with something else at stake [Kant]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 6. The Sublime
The mathematical sublime is immeasurable greatness; the dynamical sublime is overpowering [Kant, by Pinkard]
The sublime is a moral experience [Kant, by Gardner]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
Aesthetic values are not objectively valid, but we must treat them as if they are [Kant, by Scruton]
The judgement of beauty is not cognitive, but relates, via imagination, to pleasurable feelings [Kant]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
We tolerate inconsistency in ethics but not in other beliefs (which reflect an independent order) [Williams,B, by Foot]