37 ideas
4739 | In "if and only if" (iff), "if" expresses the sufficient condition, and "only if" the necessary condition [Engel] |
4643 | The Principle of Sufficient Reason does not presuppose that all explanations will be causal explanations [Baggini /Fosl] |
4633 | You cannot rationally deny the principle of non-contradiction, because all reasoning requires it [Baggini /Fosl] |
4635 | Dialectic aims at unified truth, unlike analysis, which divides into parts [Baggini /Fosl] |
4737 | Are truth-bearers propositions, or ideas/beliefs, or sentences/utterances? [Engel] |
4750 | The redundancy theory gets rid of facts, for 'it is a fact that p' just means 'p' [Engel] |
4744 | We can't explain the corresponding structure of the world except by referring to our thoughts [Engel] |
4738 | The coherence theory says truth is an internal relationship between groups of truth-bearers [Engel] |
4745 | Any coherent set of beliefs can be made more coherent by adding some false beliefs [Engel] |
4753 | Deflationism seems to block philosophers' main occupation, asking metatheoretical questions [Engel] |
4755 | Deflationism cannot explain why we hold beliefs for reasons [Engel] |
4751 | Maybe there is no more to be said about 'true' than there is about the function of 'and' in logic [Engel] |
4632 | 'Natural' systems of deduction are based on normal rational practice, rather than on axioms [Baggini /Fosl] |
4631 | In ideal circumstances, an axiom should be such that no rational agent could possibly object to its use [Baggini /Fosl] |
4752 | Deflationism must reduce bivalence ('p is true or false') to excluded middle ('p or not-p') [Engel] |
4638 | The principle of bivalence distorts reality, as when claiming that a person is or is not 'thin' [Baggini /Fosl] |
4640 | If identity is based on 'true of X' instead of 'property of X' we get the Masked Man fallacy ('I know X but not Y') [Baggini /Fosl, by PG] |
4647 | 'I have the same car as you' is fine; 'I have the same fiancée as you' is not so good [Baggini /Fosl] |
4639 | Leibniz's Law is about the properties of objects; the Identity of Indiscernibles is about perception of objects [Baggini /Fosl] |
4646 | Is 'events have causes' analytic a priori, synthetic a posteriori, or synthetic a priori? [Baggini /Fosl] |
4762 | The Humean theory of motivation is that beliefs may be motivators as well as desires [Engel] |
4754 | Our beliefs are meant to fit the world (i.e. be true), where we want the world to fit our desires [Engel] |
4763 | 'Evidentialists' say, and 'voluntarists' deny, that we only believe on the basis of evidence [Engel] |
4645 | 'A priori' does not concern how you learn a proposition, but how you show whether it is true or false [Baggini /Fosl] |
4746 | Pragmatism is better understood as a theory of belief than as a theory of truth [Engel] |
4582 | Basic beliefs are self-evident, or sensual, or intuitive, or revealed, or guaranteed [Baggini /Fosl] |
4764 | We cannot directly control our beliefs, but we can control the causes of our involuntary beliefs [Engel] |
4644 | A proposition such as 'some swans are purple' cannot be falsified, only verified [Baggini /Fosl] |
4584 | The problem of induction is how to justify our belief in the uniformity of nature [Baggini /Fosl] |
4583 | How can an argument be good induction, but poor deduction? [Baggini /Fosl] |
4634 | Abduction aims at simplicity, testability, coherence and comprehensiveness [Baggini /Fosl] |
4637 | To see if an explanation is the best, it is necessary to investigate the alternative explanations [Baggini /Fosl] |
4759 | Mental states as functions are second-order properties, realised by first-order physical properties [Engel] |
7880 | If a blind persons suddenly sees a kestrel, that doesn't make visual and theoretical kestrels different [Papineau on Jackson] |
7378 | No one bothers to imagine what it would really be like to have ALL the physical information [Dennett on Jackson] |
7377 | Mary learns when she sees colour, so her complete physical information had missed something [Jackson] |
4629 | Consistency is the cornerstone of rationality [Baggini /Fosl] |