Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Epiphenomenal Qualia', 'Goodbye Growing Block' and 'World and Essence'

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16 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
The 'identity criteria' of a name are a group of essential and established facts [Plantinga]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
'Being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterise Socrates, so they are among his properties [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Properties are 'trivially essential' if they are instantiated by every object in every possible world [Plantinga]
X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not ¬P elsewhere) [Plantinga]
If a property is ever essential, can it only ever be an essential property? [Plantinga]
Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties [Plantinga]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it [Plantinga]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
'De re' modality is as clear as 'de dicto' modality, because they are logically equivalent [Plantinga]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
We can imagine being beetles or alligators, so it is possible we might have such bodies [Plantinga]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
If a blind persons suddenly sees a kestrel, that doesn't make visual and theoretical kestrels different [Papineau on Jackson]
No one bothers to imagine what it would really be like to have ALL the physical information [Dennett on Jackson]
Mary learns when she sees colour, so her complete physical information had missed something [Jackson]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / f. Eternalism
Eternalism says all times are equally real, and future and past objects and properties are real [Merricks]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
Growing block has a subjective present and a growing edge - but these could come apart [Merricks, by PG]