20 ideas
| 8820 | Rules of reasoning precede the concept of truth, and they are what characterize it [Pollock] |
| 8819 | We need the concept of truth for defeasible reasoning [Pollock] |
| 8822 | Statements about necessities need not be necessarily true [Pollock] |
| 8818 | Defeasible reasoning requires us to be able to think about our thoughts [Pollock] |
| 8811 | What we want to know is - when is it all right to believe something? [Pollock] |
| 8817 | Logical entailments are not always reasons for beliefs, because they may be irrelevant [Pollock] |
| 8814 | Epistemic norms are internalised procedural rules for reasoning [Pollock] |
| 8823 | Reasons are always for beliefs, but a perceptual state is a reason without itself being a belief [Pollock] |
| 8813 | If we have to appeal explicitly to epistemic norms, that will produce an infinite regress [Pollock] |
| 8812 | Norm Externalism says norms must be internal, but their selection is partly external [Pollock] |
| 8816 | Externalists tend to take a third-person point of view of epistemology [Pollock] |
| 19724 | Belief is knowledge if it is true, certain, and obtained by a reliable process [Ramsey] |
| 8815 | Belief externalism is false, because external considerations cannot be internalized for actual use [Pollock] |
| 23514 | The cerbellum has a huge number of neurons, but little involvement in consciousness [Seth] |
| 23513 | Single neurons can carry out complex functions [Seth] |
| 23516 | Maybe a system is conscious if the whole generates more information than its parts [Seth] |
| 23519 | The self is embodied, perspectival, volitional, narrative and social [Seth, by PG] |
| 23518 | Modern AI is mostly machine-based pattern recognition [Seth] |
| 23517 | Volition is felt as doing what you want, with possible alternatives, and a source from within [Seth] |
| 23515 | Human exceptionalism plagues biology, and most other human thinking [Seth] |