16 ideas
| 10938 | The extremes of essentialism are that all properties are essential, or only very trivial ones [Rami] |
| 10940 | An 'individual essence' is possessed uniquely by a particular object [Rami] |
| 10939 | 'Sortal essentialism' says being a particular kind is what is essential [Rami] |
| 10934 | Unlosable properties are not the same as essential properties [Rami] |
| 15086 | Absolute necessity might be achievable either logically or metaphysically [Hale] |
| 8261 | Maybe not-p is logically possible, but p is metaphysically necessary, so the latter is not absolute [Hale] |
| 15081 | A strong necessity entails a weaker one, but not conversely; possibilities go the other way [Hale] |
| 15080 | 'Relative' necessity is just a logical consequence of some statements ('strong' if they are all true) [Hale] |
| 10933 | Physical possibility is part of metaphysical possibility which is part of logical possibility [Rami] |
| 15082 | Metaphysical necessity says there is no possibility of falsehood [Hale] |
| 15085 | 'Broadly' logical necessities are derived (in a structure) entirely from the concepts [Hale] |
| 15088 | Logical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts [Hale] |
| 10932 | If it is possible 'for all I know' then it is 'epistemically possible' [Rami] |
| 13766 | 'If' is the same as 'given that', so the degrees of belief should conform to probability theory [Ramsey, by Ramsey] |
| 15087 | Conceptual necessities are made true by all concepts [Hale] |
| 19143 | Ramsey gave axioms for an uncertain agent to decide their preferences [Ramsey, by Davidson] |