14 ideas
| 4742 | Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true [Armstrong] |
| 11970 | Logicians like their entities to exhibit a maximum degree of purity [Kaplan] |
| 9497 | Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird on Armstrong] |
| 15550 | Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 8495 | The distinction between particulars and universals is a mistake made because of language [Ramsey] |
| 8493 | We could make universals collections of particulars, or particulars collections of their qualities [Ramsey] |
| 8494 | Obviously 'Socrates is wise' and 'Socrates has wisdom' express the same fact [Ramsey] |
| 11969 | Models nicely separate particulars from their clothing, and logicians often accept that metaphysically [Kaplan] |
| 4743 | The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth [Armstrong] |
| 11971 | The simplest solution to transworld identification is to adopt bare particulars [Kaplan] |
| 11973 | Unusual people may have no counterparts, or several [Kaplan] |
| 11972 | Essence is a transworld heir line, rather than a collection of properties [Kaplan] |
| 11967 | Sentences might have the same sense when logically equivalent - or never have the same sense [Kaplan] |
| 4798 | In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Armstrong, by Psillos] |