12 ideas
12452 | Our dislike of contradiction in logic is a matter of psychology, not mathematics [Brouwer] |
12451 | Scientific laws largely rest on the results of counting and measuring [Brouwer] |
6409 | The 'simple theory of types' distinguishes levels among properties [Ramsey, by Grayling] |
12454 | Intuitionists only accept denumerable sets [Brouwer] |
12453 | Neo-intuitionism abstracts from the reuniting of moments, to intuit bare two-oneness [Brouwer] |
3212 | Beliefs are maps by which we steer [Ramsey] |
6387 | A minimum requirement for a theory of meaning is that it include an account of truth [Davidson] |
6391 | A theory of truth tells us how communication by language is possible [Davidson] |
10117 | Intuitonists in mathematics worried about unjustified assertion, as well as contradiction [Brouwer, by George/Velleman] |
6388 | Is reference the key place where language and the world meet? [Davidson] |
6390 | With a holistic approach, we can give up reference in empirical theories of language [Davidson] |
6389 | To explain the reference of a name, you must explain its sentence-role, so reference can't be defined nonlinguistically [Davidson] |