11 ideas
| 8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
| 17813 | Löwenheim-Skolem says any theory with a true interpretation has a model in the natural numbers [White,NP] |
| 17812 | Finite cardinalities don't need numbers as objects; numerical quantifiers will do [White,NP] |
| 8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
| 13766 | 'If' is the same as 'given that', so the degrees of belief should conform to probability theory [Ramsey, by Ramsey] |
| 19143 | Ramsey gave axioms for an uncertain agent to decide their preferences [Ramsey, by Davidson] |
| 8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
| 10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
| 8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
| 8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
| 4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |