Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Truth and Probability', 'The Barcan Formula and Metaphysics' and 'Value Theory'

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20 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
16186 The Barcan Formulas express how to combine modal operators with classical quantifiers [Simchen]
16187 The Barcan Formulas are orthodox, but clash with the attractive Actualist view [Simchen]
16190 BF implies that if W possibly had a child, then something is possibly W's child [Simchen]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
18680 To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
13766 'If' is the same as 'given that', so the degrees of belief should conform to probability theory [Ramsey, by Ramsey]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
16188 Serious Actualism says there are no facts at all about something which doesn't exist [Simchen]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
19143 Ramsey gave axioms for an uncertain agent to decide their preferences [Ramsey, by Davidson]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
18684 Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
18685 Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi]
18666 Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi]
18667 The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi]
18679 Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi]
18682 A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi]
18683 Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi]
18686 The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
18672 Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
18677 A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
18668 Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]
18670 The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
18669 Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]