Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Law and Causality', 'Analyticity Reconsidered' and 'Mathematical Physics'

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19 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
9376 A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
9375 Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
10993 Ramsey's Test: believe the consequent if you believe the antecedent [Ramsey, by Read]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
14279 Asking 'If p, will q?' when p is uncertain, then first add p hypothetically to your knowledge [Ramsey]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
9369 'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
9367 The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian]
9373 That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian]
9380 We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
9384 We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
9374 If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? [Boghossian]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 8. Ramsey Sentences
6894 Mental terms can be replaced in a sentence by a variable and an existential quantifier [Ramsey]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
9567 Maths deals with quantities of physical significance, ignoring irrelevant features [Geroch]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
9378 If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job? [Boghossian]
9377 'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences [Boghossian]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
9372 Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same? [Boghossian]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
17721 There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Boghossian, by Jenkins]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
9368 Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
9418 All knowledge needs systematizing, and the axioms would be the laws of nature [Ramsey]
9420 Causal laws result from the simplest axioms of a complete deductive system [Ramsey]