18 ideas
| 9376 | A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian] |
| 21697 | The Struthionic Fallacy is that of burying one's head in the sand [Quine] |
| 3750 | "It is true that x" means no more than x [Ramsey] |
| 21698 | All relations, apart from ancestrals, can be reduced to simpler logic [Quine] |
| 9375 | Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian] |
| 21696 | Nominalism rejects both attributes and classes (where extensionalism accepts the classes) [Quine] |
| 9369 | 'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation [Boghossian] |
| 9367 | The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian] |
| 9373 | That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian] |
| 9380 | We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian] |
| 9384 | We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory [Boghossian] |
| 9374 | If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? [Boghossian] |
| 18818 | Sentence meaning is given by the actions to which it would lead [Ramsey] |
| 9378 | If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job? [Boghossian] |
| 9377 | 'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences [Boghossian] |
| 9372 | Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same? [Boghossian] |
| 17721 | There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Boghossian, by Jenkins] |
| 9368 | Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian] |