Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Leibniz: Guide for the Perplexed', 'Intro to 'The Reason's Proper Study'' and 'Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology'

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20 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
13939 No possible evidence could decide the reality of numbers, so it is a pseudo-question [Carnap]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / c. Grelling's paradox
10631 If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
10624 The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
10629 If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright]
10628 The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
13936 Questions about numbers are answered by analysis, and are analytic, and hence logically true [Carnap]
8748 Logical positivists incorporated geometry into logicism, saying axioms are just definitions [Carnap, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
10622 The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
8960 Internal questions about abstractions are trivial, and external ones deeply problematic [Carnap, by Szabó]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
13933 Existence questions are 'internal' (within a framework) or 'external' (concerning the whole framework) [Carnap]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
13934 To be 'real' is to be an element of a system, so we cannot ask reality questions about the system itself [Carnap]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
13938 A linguistic framework involves commitment to entities, so only commitment to the framework is in question [Carnap]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
10626 Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
13935 We only accept 'things' within a language with formation, testing and acceptance rules [Carnap]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
19347 Substance needs independence, unity, and stability (for individuation); also it is a subject, for predicates [Perkins]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
13932 Empiricists tend to reject abstract entities, and to feel sympathy with nominalism [Carnap]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism
13937 New linguistic claims about entities are not true or false, but just expedient, fruitful or successful [Carnap]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
13940 All linguistic forms in science are merely judged by their efficiency as instruments [Carnap]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
10630 Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
10627 Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright]