8 ideas
21855 | Only in the 1780s did it become acceptable to read Spinoza [Lord] |
18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
19347 | Substance needs independence, unity, and stability (for individuation); also it is a subject, for predicates [Perkins] |
16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
21866 | Hobbes and Spinoza use 'conatus' to denote all endeavour for advantage in nature [Lord] |
16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |